The Center for Ethics and Public Affairs at the Murphy Institute at Tulane University has extended the application deadline for residential Faculty Fellowships for the 2014-2015 academic year. The new application deadline is February 15, 2014.
If your first name begins with V, W, X, Y, or Z, it's your special month, the one in which we especially encourage you to post on PEA Soup. Please pay heed to the calendar of events when doing so, in order to give any planned events a few days to breathe.
On behalf of Russ Shafer-Landau I'm very pleased to announce a Call for Papers for the 2nd annual Marc Sanders Prize in Metaethics.
The winner of the prize will receive $8,000, present his or her paper at the next Wisconsin Metaethics Workshop, and have the winning paper included in a forthcoming volume of Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
We're very pleased to announce the first PEA Soup discussion of a paper published in Politics Philosophy & Economics. We will kick off with A.J. Julius's piece 'The Possibility of Exchange', which is available here.The discussion will open on Monday, December the 16th. Victor Tadros has kindly agreed to write a critical précis, and Richard Arneson, Stephanie Collins, Mark Reiff, Nicos Stravoupalos and Andrew Williams will take part in the discussion. We're looking forward to a great conversation!
It is an interesting fact about many of our most important choices, such as the choice of what kind of education to pursue, whether and whom to marry, and whether to have children – for short, life choices – that they transform us in ways we can’t fully anticipate, so that the person who lives with the consequences of the choice won’t be quite the same as the person who makes the choice. Recently, L.A. Paul has argued in a stimulating paper that the existence of such transformative experiences causes serious trouble for rational decision-making. I’ll grant here that her argument is more or less successful to the extent that the phenomenal quality of our experiences is central to the value of a choice or preference among options.
I am pleased to introduce this month's featured philosopher: me. Please join me in welcoming me.
[Added Monday morning 18 November by Shoemaker: Because of some random spamming difficulties, all comments will now be moderated. Please be patient, as comments must now be read and approved prior to being published.]
We are very pleased to begin our announced Ethics discussion of Erich Hatala Matthes' piece, “History, Value, and Irreplaceability," which can be found open access here. Carolyn Korsmeyer, professor of philosophy at the University of Buffalo (SUNY), will open the discussion with the critical précis below the fold. Here now is Korsmeyer. Thanks to everyone for participating, and here's to a great discussion!
UPDATE!! SCIENTIFIC PROOF THAT A SUBSTANTIVE PROPERTY OF FINAL VALUE IS A PHILOSOPHER'S FANTASY (AND THAT EVEN PHILOSOPHERS DON'T TRULY BELIEVE IT).
(Sorry for the sensationalism, but suddenly one needs to compete for an audience around here! And I think I "buried the lead" in my original post.)...
I thought I’d take this opportunity to present one of the crazier ideas I’ve been working on. In the spirit of Philippa Foot’s “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives” (1972) and like-minded philosophers, I’ve argued (e.g. in my forthcoming book, Confusion of Tongues) that thin normative words like ‘good’ and ‘ought’ are essentially relativized to ends or goals (what I call an “end-relational” theory). So any logically complete sentence of the form ‘p is good’ is implicitly relativized to some relevant end: ‘p is good [for e]’, which I’ve interpreted as meaning roughly that p promotes/ raises the probability of e, or: e is more likely given p than given not-p.
This view encounters an obvious objection from final value: judgments about what is good “for its own sake”. What should an end-relational theory say about ‘good for its own sake’?