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June 2005

June 27, 2005

Against Satisficing Consequentialism

Satisficing consequentialism (SC) is the view that an act is morally right iff its consequences are “good enough.” Michael Slote came up with a few well-known examples in support of SC. One involves a fairy-tale hero who, when rewarded by the gods with whatever he asks for, just asks for himself and his family to be comfortably well-off. Another involves a motel owner who gives some stranded motorists the first available room rather than the best available room. I think SC is untenable. It permits agents to bring about a submaximal outcome in order to prevent a better outcome from obtaining.

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Utilitarianism 2005

The program for the Utilitarianism 2005 conference (Aug. 11-14 at Dartmouth) has now been posted.  Participants include Peter Singer, Shelly Kagan, Frank Jackson, David Brink, Gerald Postema, Lori Gruen, Fred Feldman, Garrett Cullity, Alastair Norcross, Kryster Bykvist, Michael Zimmerman, and many others, including several PEA Soup contributors and commenters.

June 26, 2005

New journal in the history of ethics

I hereby shamlessly plug a new journal with which I am associated, Studies in the History of Ethics. Studies is a new web-based, peer reviewed journal dedicated to publishing high quality articles and reviews in the history of ethics. We've just published our first batch of articles:

C. McCluskey (St. Louis), Willful Wrongoindg:  Thomas Aquinas on  certa malitia

Symposium on Kant and his Historical Predecessors
- A. Wood (Stanford), Kant's History of Ethics

- S. McAleer (Wisconsin - Eau Claire), Kant and Aristotle on the Difficulty of Moral Knowledge: Lessons from the Doctrine of Virtue

We're also actively accepting submissions.  Visit our website  for more details.

June 25, 2005

Avoiding Consequentialism's Demands

Consequentialism, many philosophers have claimed, asks too much of us to be a plausible ethical theory. Indeed, consequentialism’s severe demandingness is often claimed to be its chief flaw. I will try to show that consequentialism’s demandingness cannot be the theory’s downfall. I do not here aim to vindicate consequentialism or demonstrate that it is not too demanding. What I think I can show is that the demandingness of consequentialism cannot plausibly be the decisive objection to the view. This is the case because the demandingness objection, in any plausible form, requires that we already reject consequentialism before it can be persuasive. Unless we presuppose an ethically significant distinction between, for example, causing and allowing, or intending and foreseeing, any moral theory that is less demanding than consequentialism will permit us to cause or intend too much to be at all plausible. Thus, key components of consequentialism must already be assumed or argued to be false before the demandingness objection can get a grip. Thus the demandingness objection should not be what persuades us that consequentialism is false. The arguments I use to show this are not new, I borrow them from Shelly Kagan and others,  but they are underappreciated and have not been made in the most useful and general way.

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June 08, 2005

Normative Equivalence

Sometimes moral philosophers engage in genuine debate. Sometimes, however, it turns out the apparent debate is merely verbal; the philosophers do not disagree about the fundamental normative facts. When this happens, let us say that the apparently conflicting normative theories are normatively equivalent. It seems to me that it’s important to be able to determine whether an apparent debate between ethicists is real or merely apparent. In this post, I propose a test for determining when normative theories are normatively equivalent, sketch an argument that this is a good test for normative equivalency, and briefly discuss why it can still be difficult to use this test.

Consider two cases, each involving allegedly competing theories:

 Case 1:

 Philosopher A: I think that a morally right action is one that maximizes utility; you ought to do what is best. But I also believe in an “all things considered ought”, and sometimes what one all things ought to do is not what one morally ought to do. Sometimes one “all things considered” ought to look out for number one, and take that fishing trip.

Philosopher B: Utilitarianism is a false theory; sometimes it is morally permissible to not maximize utility. Maximizing utility is prima facie obligatory; but so is looking out for number one. So sometimes one ought not maximize utility, but instead take that fishing trip. I also believe in an “all things considered ought”, but I hold that one should always do what one morally ought to do.

 Case 2:

 Philosopher A: The only thing that directly contributes to welfare is pleasure. You want to live a good life? Then ensure that you are really happy. However, although I hold that the only thing that improves your welfare is pleasure, I also hold that you can have rational prudential interests in other things besides pleasure, such as accomplishing important goals. And sometimes it is prudent or rational even from a purely self-interested standpoint to sacrifice your own welfare in order to accomplish those goals.

 Philosopher B: I am a pluralist about welfare: I believe that pleasure and accomplishment both contribute to your welfare. However, I deny that you can have rational prudential interests in things besides those that directly contribute to your welfare. From a purely self-interested standpoint, your own welfare is the only thing that matters.

 Both cases might seem to involve only verbal disagreement. But how could we check?

 I will make use of the notion of a reason when formulating a test.  A reason is a consideration in favor of doing something or taking a stance towards some proposition. Reasons are things that persons can have; the come in various strengths (my reasons for helping the poor might be weaker than my reasons for helping my wife); they can be reasons to perform actions; or they can be reasons to have a certain attitude (such as fear, desire, or attitudinal pleasure) towards a certain proposition; finally, one’s reasons can (presumably) differ from time to time. 

 Let us call any proposition of the form, “person p has a reason of strength n at time t for doing action A or standing in propositional attitude r to proposition o”, a reason-stating proposition. An example of a reason-stating proposition: Kris McDaniel has a reason of strength 10 right now to feel somewhat guilty about not contributing to the Pea Soup Ethics Blog.” We will also allow propositions derivable by replacing the free variables with variables bound by a quantifier to count as a reason-stating proposition. Example: All persons have a reason of some strength at some time for taking pleasure in the fact that Henry Heathwood is taking innocent delight in discovering new things about the world. Finally, let’s count propositions consisting of reason-stating propositions and Boolean operations on these propositions as reason-stating propositions. [But we will exclude tautological or contradictory propositions from counting as reason-stating propositions.] Example: Kris McDaniel has a reason of strength 10 right now to feel somewhat guilty about not contributing to the Pea Soup Ethics Blog and Ben Bradley has a reason of strength 4 right now to chastise Kris.

 The test is this:  Theory A is normatively equivalent to theory B if and only if, for any reason-stating proposition p, A entails p if and only if B entails p. 

In short, if two normative theories have exactly the same implications about what reasons we have, then the two normative theories are describing the same normative facts. (Note that the two theories may not be equivalent across the board, since one theory may “take a stand” on something non-normative as well.)

Here is a quick, far too sketchy defense of the test:

(1) Any proposition attributing a normative feature (such as being good, being unjust, or being vicious) to a thing or things is necessarily equivalent to some reason-stating proposition. 

[A defense of (1): if (1) isn’t true, then the alleged normative feature isn’t really normative, since it is the giving of reasons (of some sort or other) that makes a feature normative.]

           (2) If (1), then the test is an adequate test of normative equivalence. 

            [A defense of (2): Suppose (1) is true. Then any normative theory is equivalent to some                 theory whose normative content can be expressed entirely in terms of reasons. Then the             normative contents of any two theories are identical provided they say the same things                 about what reasons we have. But this seems to mean that the proposed test for normative             equivalency is adequate.]

In order to apply the test to the two cases above, we need to reformulate both sets of theories in terms of reasons. Only then are we in a position to determine whether the alleged disagreement is real or merely apparent. 

June 07, 2005

2nd Annual Metaethics Workshop

The program for the Second Annual Metaethics Workshop, Sept. 16-18, has been announced.  It's below the fold.  Congratulations to frequent PEA Soup commentor Robert Johnson for getting on the program!

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June 04, 2005

Actualist Utilitarianism and Practical Impotence

Actualist Utilitarianism (AU) is, roughly stated, the view that we ought to act so as to maximise the sum total of actual people's utilities. (By utility is here meant a numerical representation of a person's level of wellbeing, or welfare.) It is distinguished from regular utilitarianism in that it excludes the utilities of "merely possible people" from figuring in our moral judgements. And, for this reason, it might be motivated by various "person-affecting" intuitions to the effect that merely possible people are morally insignificant. I shall not, however, try to develop that line of motivation here. Rather, I want to focus on an objection to AU advanced by John Broome in his recent book Weighing Lives. (Although Broome doesn't consider the case of AU in particular, he does object to "actualist axiologies" more generally, and his objection is applicable to AU. With that clarification noted, I shall for simplicity proceed as though Broome's objection is aimed specifically at AU.)

The objection, in short, is that AU is incapable of giving practical adivice. As Broome understands AU, it implies that what the agent ought to do in a given situation of choice may sometimes depend on what he actually does in that situation. Thus, if the agent were to ask "ought I to do X?", then the best practical advice that AU could give him would be prefaced with "well, that all depends on whehter or not you actually do X." But that would be no practical advice at all; usually we want to know whether or not it's permissible to do something in advance of our having done or not having done it. Understood in this way, then, AU will be practically impotent -- of no use at all in deciding what to do.

As I shall argue, however, AU need not be understood in this way. Below I suggest two formulations of AU, and show that only one of these is vulnerable to Broome's objection.

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June 02, 2005

Criticizing Contractualism

Lest anyone think that Campbell Brown went on a murderous rampage against all other PEA Brains to take over the blog for himself, I feel I should jump in and post something to let people know the rest of us are alive and to pick up some of our summer slack (and perhaps to give the Kiwi a rest).

So I'm going to steal shamelessly from the David Sobel playbook (he did something similar on consequentialism recently) and ask people to offer their favorite objections to contractualism.  You can either then immediately offer a way to reply, or you can leave that to others.

I'll start.  Contractualism can't be the fundamental criterion of rightness, insofar as  the reasons trotted out in support of the reasonable agreement that allegedly gives rise to contractualist principles will actually depend on more fundamental moral principles.  That is, it can't be that what makes it wrong to kill babies is that doing so would not be in accord with principles that no reasonable person could reject; instead, there'd be general agreement on such principles precisely because it's wrong to kill babies.

June 01, 2005

Praise in Poker and Ethics

Within consequentialism, it's common to draw a distinction between two kinds of rightness: an act X is said to be objectively right just when, among the alternatives open to the agent, X will, as a matter of objective fact, have the best consequences; whereas X is said to be subjectively right just when the agent believes (or may reasonably believe) that X will have the best consequences. Thus, the question arises -- at least for consequentialists -- which of these two varieties of rightness is primary in ethics. Which, if either, is the more important or relevant kind of rightness? (I imagine that a similar distinction can be drawn in non-consequentialist ethics; so this is a question for everyone. But it'll simplify things to frame the issue in consequentialist terms.)

A common argument given by subjectivists -- i.e. those who hold that subjective rightness is primary -- appeals to the notions of praise and blame. Surely, it is said, when it comes to praising and blaming people's actions, it is only subjective rightness that is at issue. We cannot hold a person responsible for the (reasonably) unforeseen consequences of her actions. If a person acts in the (reasonable) belief that by so acting she will bring about the best possible world, given her alternatives, then she should not be blamed for so acting, even in the event that her belief turns out to be false. Hence, if ethics is primarily an exercise in apportioning praise and blame, subjective rightness is primary.

I want to suggest that common practises of praising and blaming, as exemplified by poker players, put pressure on the argument just outlined.

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