Here’s an interesting quote from Stephen Darwall’s entry on “Normativity” in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
On one popular view, morality is normative for action by its very nature, so that to say that an action is wrong is to imply that one ought not to do it. …But it may be that morality is indeed normative, only not for action as the first view supposes. It may be, as Mill proposed, that the concept of moral wrong is tied to the appropriateness of certain sanctions and ‘sanctioning emotions’ such as blame, guilt, indignation and so on…. On this view, morality’s normativity directly concerns not the acts that are said to be right or wrong, but certain reactive emotions and their natural expressions. If this is right, an action could be wrong (and so something one morally ought not to do) without being something one (categorically) ought not to do. Its being morally wrong would consist in its being something that warrants blame and guilt, and that might be true even if there were [sufficient or decisive] reason to do it.