There are at least two possible ways we might conceive of the too demanding objection: (1) a moral theory is too demanding if it demands more of us than commonsense morality demands of us (that is, if its demands conflict with our commonsense moral intuitions) or (2) a moral theory is too demanding if it demands more of us than we have sufficient reason to give. When philosophers claim that act-utilitarianism is too demanding are they claiming that it is too demanding in sense (1), sense (2), or both? Which version of the objection is more powerful? Can you think of any instances in which commonsense morality seems too demanding? If so, that would speak in favor of (2). I’ve thought of perhaps two examples. First, commonsense morality seems to include the idea that we should (almost) never leave a man behind—that is, we should try to rescue someone even if the expected costs of our doing so far exceed the expected benefits. Think here of the movie Black Hawk Down. Second, commonsense morality seems to condemn Gauguin’s abandoning his family to live and paint in Tahiti. But I think that in both instances commonsense morality demands more from these agents than they have sufficient reason to give and is for that reason objectionable. I’m not entirely happy with these examples though. Can anyone else think of better examples?