Judgment internalism (which holds that a necessary condition on a judgment of the form "x has reason to y", when stated by x, is that x have some motivation to y) is often used as a crucial plank in arguments for noncognitivism. Very roughly speaking, if there is a necessary connection between normative judgment and motivation, what could normative judgment be if not an expression of these various motivational or conative states? But some have claimed that there is a good argument for existence internalism (which holds--in the version I'm most interested in--that an agent x can have a reason to y only if they have an existing motivation to y) to be found in the truth of judgment internalism. The argument from judgment to existence internalism has always struck me as a little fishy, but I've only recently tried to figure out why. My diagnosis is below the fold, but I'd love to hear whether you think I've given this argument short shrift.