PEA Soup

Act vs. orientation?

There's been an important discussion going on at Brian Leiter's blog (here and here). There's a petition, signed by well over 1000 members of the American Philosophical Association, encouraging the APA to either drop its policy that schools advertising in the JFP may not discriminate based on sexual orientation, or enforce the policy. There's also a counter-petition, signed by, perhaps, a few dozen APA members, which urges the APA to stick with the status quo.

That brings me to the substantive part of this post.

Welcome, Neil Sinhababu!

We are pleased to announce that Neil Sinhababu has accepted our invitation to become a contributor here at PEA Soup. Neil recently received a Ph.D. from the University of Texas, Austin, and is currently an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the National University of Singapore. Along with Brian Leiter, he is an editor of Nietzsche and Morality, to which he also contributed his “Vengeful Thinking and Moral Epistemology.” His paper “Possible Girls” appeared last year in the Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, and his paper “The Humean Theory of Motivation Reformulated and Defended” is forthcoming in The Philosophical Review.

Welcome, Sergio Tenenbaum!

We are pleased to announce that Sergio Tenenbaum, Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toronto, has accepted our invitation to become a contributor here at PEA Soup.  He has written numerous articles and chapters on a wide array of topics related to moral philosophy, and his book, Appearances of the Good: An Essay on the Nature of Practical Reason, was published in 2007 by Cambridge University Press. Welcome!

Welcome, Lionel K. McPherson!

We are pleased to announce that Lionel K. McPherson has accepted our invitation to become a contributor here at PEA Soup. Lionel is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Tufts University. He is the author of several journal articles, which have appeared in journals such as Ethics, Journal of Philosophy, and Philosophy & Public Affairs. His research interests include race, normativity, war and terrorism, and the basis and extent of our obligations. 

A dilemma for interrogational torture?

Several months back, Ralph's post on torture provoked a good deal of valuable discussion, so I wanted to draw attention to C.A.J. Coady's review of a recent book by Bob Brecher, a book that deals only with the  'ticking time bomb' scenario often used by defenders of torture. The book looks intriguing because (a) this scenario seems to be the one that leads even those otherwise morally opposed to torture to make an exception, and (b) the scenario deals with the only rationale that (at least in my opinion)  is even a candidate for morally justifiying torture, namely, that torture could be used as an interrogation method to extract information that could prevent significant amounts of harm to innocent people.

The Inverted Experience Machine

One of the most influential arguments in the philosophical study of well-being is Robert Nozick's famous 'experience machine' thought experiment. Suppose that you had the opportunity to enter a machine that would give you the subjective experience of having an extraordinary life -- it would seem to you that you were a rock star and a great philosopher and a devoted spouse, all at the same time -- even though, all the while, you would really just be lying there inside the machine. Would you choose to plug in? Many people say no, and Nozick therefore infers that we not only value having positive subjective experiences but also having a life that is in reality a good one.

In a forthcoming paper, Felipe De Brigard challenges this conclusion by conducting an innovative series of experimental studies. At the heart of his approach is a new thought experiment, which we might call the 'inverted experience machine.'

Gatekeepers to the Profession

In his comment on this post, Dave Shoemaker writes:

Too often we act as kinds of gatekeepers, judging that if students aren't sufficiently "like us" (in terms of grades, drive, class participation, political inclination, Monty Python proclivities), then they probably shouldn't even try. This attitude contributes more than we think to keeping out students not "like us," and so may have something to do with the shoddy percentages of women and minorities in philosophy.

I think that this is a very important point. In fact, I think that it’s important enough to deserve its own separate thread. Thus, I hereby open this thread for discussion of what, if anything, we should do to avoid acting as gatekeepers to the profession.

Scanlon conference at Manchester

Conference Announcement:

"Justice, Rights and Institutions: Themes from the Political Philosophy of T. M. Scanlon"

(Apologies for cross-posting. This conference now has an increased capacity, and so registration has just re-opened. Deadline for registration is 18 March 2009)

The ethics of advising

It's nearing that time when graduate programs admit students. Should any of us be encouraging our students to pursue a PhD in philosophy? If so, under what conditions?

Thomas Benton takes up the issue in a recent CHE piece. His advice to undergraduates: you should attend graduate school in the humanities only if you satisfy one of these conditions:

• You are independently wealthy, and you have no need to earn a living for yourself or provide for anyone else.
• You come from that small class of well-connected people in academe who will be able to find a place for you somewhere.
• You can rely on a partner to provide all of the income and benefits needed by your household.
• You are earning a credential for a position that you already hold — such as a high-school teacher — and your employer is paying for it.

His rationale is basically the horrible and worsening prospects for finding gainful and satisfying employment upon completion. The financial and emotional risks are just too great to justify the gamble.

Do you agree? Is he being too pessimistic?

G. E. Moore and his young godson

There’s a story that I heard from my father many years ago, which I’m tempted to share with PEA Soupers. G. E. Moore was a Cambridge friend and contemporary of my great-grandfather Ralph L. Wedgwood (1874-1956), and so when my grandfather John H. Wedgwood (1907-1989) was born, Moore agreed to be his godfather.

According to the story, my grandfather, then a small boy, had the following conversation with Moore, while Moore was visiting my great-grandparents’ house for a couple of days.

Small boy: What are you doing, Mr Moore?

Moore (earnestly): I’m writing a book, about the meaning of the word ‘good’.

Small boy: You mean, like when we say that something’s “gone for good”?

Moore (taken aback): Oh! I hadn’t thought of that!

The trouble with this story is that I really doubt that it’s true.