PEA Soup

Arguments from Disagreement

There is a powerful argument that is frequently used in metaethics (and elsewhere). It’s based on the idea that disagreement requires shared concepts. Thus, by looking at who we can intuitively disagree with we can determine who we share our concepts with. And, in when it comes to morality, it seems we can disagree with people who classify very different things under moral terms. As a result, it is argued, ethical terms cannot have ‘descriptive content’. I used to think that this great argument works. Today I’m feeling less certain about this and I’d like to hear about your thoughts. Here is why.

Virtue Ethics and the Analysis of Right and Wrong Action

Five years ago I was up-to-date on virtue ethics.  I've been ignoring it for a few years, so please forgive me if what I'm about to say is old news.

Rosalind Hursthouse argues: "An action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances, except for in tragic dilemmas, in which a decision is right if it is what the agent would choose, but the action decided upon may be too terrible to be deemed right or good."

One traditional worry with this is a variation of the Euthyphro problem: Does the virtuous agent perform the action because it's right or is it right because the virtuous agent would do it.  Hursthouse takes the first horn of the dilemma and tries to argue that this is not a problem for virtue ethics.

However, I think that the analysis of right action is mistaken.  There are (I think) counterexamples.

Kudos!

In case the cash is not enough, congratulations to Dave Shoemaker for his 3 Quarks Daily Prize in Philosophy for  this posting on Scanlon on Moral Responsibility and Blame!

Surely a few drops of glory have rained into the general PEA Soup pot (note Dennett's blurb on the award page). Good comments, and I'm sure it didn't hurt that Tim dropped by.

Against Actualism

In “Oughts, Options, and Actualism” (Philosophical Review 1986), Frank Jackson and Robert Pargetter defended the “actualist” view that, for every act-type A, you ought to do A if and only if your conduct would be (in the relevant way) better if you did A than if you did not.

In my opinion, this is a deeply objectionable view. It makes the truth about whether or not you ought to do A dependent on the brute non-moral facts about what you would do if you did A (and about what you would do if you did not do A) – even if these brute non-moral facts reflect only your utter wickedness and depravity. In this sense, this “actualist” view gives an agent’s wickedness the power to effect a radical transformation in the obligations that the agent has.

For example, imagine a wicked paedophile, who has just abducted a 10-year-old girl and imprisoned her in his secret cellar. Suppose that it is still possible – though unfortunately quite unlikely – that the paedophile will repent of his evil plans, and return the girl unharmed to her parents. Surely, if anything is clear about this case, it is clear that it is not true that the paedophile ought to rape the girl.

But (shockingly, as it seems to me) actualists like Jackson and Pargetter may well disagree...

Welcome Anita Superson!

We are happy to announce that Anita Superson has accepted our invitation to be a contributor here at PEA Soup.  Anita is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Kentucky, and specializes in ethical theory, feminism, and issues at their intersections.  It's great to have you aboard, Anita!

CFP: Political Realism in Comparative Perspective

CALL FOR PAPERS
POLITICAL REALISM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
PACIFIC DIVISION MEETING OF THE APA
MARCH 31 – APRIL 4, 2010
SAN FRANCISCO, CA

The International Society for the Comparative Study of Chinese and Western
Philosophy (ISCWP) is seeking presentations on Hobbes, Machiavelli, or any
major Western political thinker committed to developing political principles
within constraints set by realistic accounts of human behavior and
motivation. Topics might include (but are not limited to) Hobbesian views of
human nature, moral or psychological egoism, or realist accounts of state
legitimacy.

Buck-passing bleg

Suppose I wanted to get up to speed on the buck-passing-account literature. What three to five things would you say are "must reading"?

Recruiting Philosophy Majors

At the "start of the year" college meeting last week our dean showed some Powerpoint slides listing the number of majors in each department over the last few years.  The point was to illustrate how the college is growing across the board.  Philosophy wasn't exactly a good illustration of his point, however.  In F08, the latest year for which he had data, we had only 39 majors.  That was more than in F03, but not only is it a small number in absolute terms, it is less than in the prior two years.  Next year's number should be slightly higher, and I think that we may not be getting credit for a few double majors.  Still, we don't have the number of majors that we should have, and among other problems this means that important and worthwhile courses are being canceled for lack of enrollment---theory of knowledge and philosophy of natural science being two recent examples.  As department chair, I need to do something to help the department recruit more majors.  But what?