PEA Soup

Upcoming Conference: "Ethics, Imagination, Forms of Life" and the Work of Cora Diamond, Sept 13-15

Cora Diamond's work in ethics will be the focus of an upcoming conference, "Ethics, Imagination, Forms of Life," to be held September 13-15, 2010 at the Université de Picardie, Aiens, in the North of Paris.  Professor Diamond will be commenting on the papers and participating in the ensuing discussion.  You can find more information here: http://www.u-picardie.fr/labo/curapp/

 

3 Quarks Daily Philosophy Blog Writing Prize

Nominations are open for the second philosophy blog writing prize at 3 Quarks Daily.  Follow this link for details.

Souper Top Tenners

Congratulations to two of our PEA Soupers who have made the list of the top ten philosophy articles from 2009.  Jamie Dreier's "Relativism (and Expressivism) and the Problem of Disagreement," from Philosophical Perspectives v. 23, and Mark Schroeder's "Hybrid Expressivism: Virtues and Vices," from Ethics v. 119 both made the list.  (This is Mark's second year in a row in the top ten!)  Well done, gentlemen!

Am I a Consequentialist?

I am intellectually persuaded by the arguments for Consequentialism. However, like most people in that situation, by my own lights I fail to live up the demands of that moral theory by a wide margin. And again, like most in my situation I suspect, this is a source of disquiet but not persistent hand-wringing. But there is another moral view one might attribute to me. It is more deontological in tone. And this other moral code is connected much more directly to emotional reactions such as guilt and moralized anger. If others cheat in a business deal or steal (except in desperation) and I am close enough to the situation, I will likely have an engaged moral reaction to such a person. I will speak badly of them, refuse to hang with them, and think poorly of them. Yet the decently well-off person who fails to contribute much money to an effective charity does not elicit such reactions in me to a similar degree. Similarly, while I myself regularly fail to be governed by consequentialist morality in my actions or my emotional reactions to my or other’s actions, I am quite effectively governed in both my actions and my emotions to this other moral view. My conscience, let’s call it, effectively keeps me from doing a wide range of things such as lying, cheating, stealing, hurting and so on. In most cases I simply would not dream of doing such things and if I did somehow do some such thing (or even fear that I did) I would likely feel really bad about it. Such governance in deed and action would, if I believed in commonsense (more deontological) morality, pass for tolerable moral motivation.

There are unknowable moral truths

Many philosophers doubt the possibility of unknowable moral truths. E.g. Thomas Nagel said (in The View from Nowhere, p. 139):

I do not believe that the truth about how we should live could extend radically beyond any capacity that we might have to discover it (apart from its dependence on nonevaluative facts that we might be unable to discover).

But in fact, there is a simple argument -- unsurprisingly, broadly Williamsonian in inspiration -- that shows that there must be unknowable moral truths.

Note (added on 10 August 2010): Jussi Suikkanen has correctly pointed out that he made what is in all essentials the very same argument on this blog over two years ago. The record also reveals that I read his post at that time (although I somehow now have no recollection of having done so). So it is Jussi, and not I, who should be regarded as the first to have presented this argument in public!

What does 'ought' implies 'can' imply about moral dilemmas?

I've had moral dilemmas on my mind lately, and I'm troubled by a common argument given against the possibility of genuine moral dilemmas. I'm hoping people can help diagnose what's troubling me. And I apologize in advance for the disorganized thinking.

Here's the argument: Suppose an individual S is obligated both to perform act A and obligated to perform act B. S is therefore obligated to perform (A&B). Assuming that for S to be obligated to ø entails that S ought to ø, then S ought to A, ought to B, and ought (A&B). Applying 'ought' implies 'can,' then S ought (A&B) entails S can (A&B). But the circumstances of the world are such that S is metaphysically precluded from performing (A&B), so she cannot (A&B). Hence, it is both true that S ought (A&B) and false that S ought (A&B).

Supervenience, Properties, and Relations

Supervenience-based arguments for moral naturalism have tended to apply only to moral properties, not to relations.  One might have thought that they could easily be generalised so as to apply to relations as well.  However, as I'll argue here, this may not be so easy.

Ethics Discussions at PEA Soup: Mikhail (Mike) Valdman's "Outsourcing Self-Government," with commentary by Steve Wall

We are pleased to present the fourth installment of PEA Soup's collaboration with Ethics, in which we host a discussion of one article from an issue of the journal. The article selected from Volume 120, Issue 4 is Mikhail (Mike) Valdman's "Outsourcing Self-Government" (open access copy here). We are very grateful that Steve Wall has agreed to provide the critical precis of Mike's article, and his commentary begins below the fold.