Deadline for abstracts: January 20, 2012 (for instructions, see below)
The relation between moral judgments and moral motivation is a central issue in ethical theory. According to motivational internalism, making a moral judgment implies being motivated to act accordingly, at least under normal circumstances. The truth of motivational internalism is highly contested, and often taken to have implications for the nature of moral emotions and moral judgments, the meaning of normative terms, and the possibility of objective truth and knowledge in morality.
During the last two decades, various new forms of motivational internalism have raised questions both about possible sources of evidence for and against these forms, and about the metaethical relevance of a defensible internalism. Some forms seem to be straightforward empirical claims, making traditional a priori arguments for or against internalism suspect; other forms make it unclear how internalism would favor moral anti-realism over realism. (For an overview of recent work on motivational internalism, see this Analysis paper.)
The conference Moral Motivation: Evidence and Relevance will bring together senior and junior scholars working on both issues of evidence and issues of relevance.
Continue reading "CFA: "Moral Motivation: Evidence and Relevance" Conference, Gothenburg, Sweden, 18-20 May 2012" »
The excellent lineup is below the fold. For more information, go to the conference web site.
Also, a small number of student bursaries are available to cover up to 50% of the conference and accommodation fees only, offered on a first come first served basis. To apply for a student bursary please contact Dr. Neil Sinclair.
To participate please register online here (early registration would be greatly appreciated).
Continue reading "“Ethics and Explanation” Conference, University of Nottingham, 18th-19th November 2011" »
Assume that my performing x would have beneficial effect, B1, providing me with an additional +19 utiles on Wednesday. Assume that my performing y would have detrimental effect, D1, providing me with an additional -10 utiles on Thursday. And assume that my performing z would have detrimental effect, D2, providing me with an additional -10 utiles on Friday. Lastly, assume that these are the only effects of these actions and that the timing of the effects is irrelevant.
Now, I think that many would say that the fact that my performing x would have beneficial effect B1 constitutes a reason for me to perform x. But, of course, my performing x&y&z (the conjunctive act) also has beneficial effect B1. So do I likewise have a reason to perform x&y&z? My intuition is that I have no reason at all to perform the conjunctive act x&y&z. Of course, those who want to claim that I do have some reason to perform x&y&z can cite the fact that the reason that I have to perform x&y&z is outweighed (although just barely) by the reasons that I have to refrain from performing x&y&z. But to my mind that’s not enough. Again, I’m inclined to deny that I have any reason at all to perform x&y&z.
Continue reading "Reasons and Conjunctive Acts" »
Below the fold, I post the program for the 2012 Arizona Workshop on Normative Ethics, which will be held at the Westward Look Resort in Tucson, AZ, on Janurary 5-7, 2012. The program looks excellent and has a fine representation of PEA Brains. Registration is free and open to all. You may register by emailing Mark Timmons: mtimmons[symbol for at]email.arizona.edu. Information about the Westward Look resort and about travel and accommodations is available on the workshop website: http://ethics.arizona.edu.
Continue reading "Program for the 2012 Arizona Workshop on Normative Ethics " »
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