PEA Soup

New Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy

The latest addition to the Oxford Studies series is Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy. It will be edited by David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne, and Steve Wall. There will be an annual conference and an annual volume published by Oxford. The conference will rotate between Tucson (AZ), Columbia (MO), and Lincoln (NE).  It is possible every fourth conference will be in Europe, but that remains to be determined. The format for all this will be broadly familiar to those familiar with the Madison metaethics, Arizona normative ethics, and recent NOWAR Oxford Studies conferences and volumes, but there will be differences in format worth noting. Stay tuned to this space for calls for papers and further information.

CFA: Moral Psychology and Poverty Alleviation

Where: New Haven, Yale University

When: April 13, 2012

Deadline for submission: March 2, 2012

 

Many individuals in affluent nations are aware that a vast number of people live in conditions of severe poverty. Yet they are more likely to go to the movies or to buy an expensive sweater than they are to give their money to humanitarian aid. The question arises, how can individuals be motivated to act on their duties to aid the global poor?

The Global Justice Program and the Department of Cognitive Science invite the submission of 350-500 word abstracts for 25-minute presentations on the subject of ‘Moral Psychology and Poverty Alleviation” for their upcoming workshop. 

The conference aims to stimulate research that can be used to develop more effective means of motivating individuals to act on their moral obligations to alleviate global poverty.  For more information about topics relevant to the conference see http://asap.betaelements.net/projects/moral-psychology-and-poverty-alleviation/

Welcome, Alec Walen!

We are pleased to welcome Alec Walen as a contributor here at PEA Soup.  Alec is Associate Professor at Rutgers University, jointly appointed in Law, Philosophy, and Criminal Justice, and he works in both moral theory and legal theory.  Welcome aboard, Alec!

Survey says: Doug’s wrong

Well, not quite. The survey showed that about one-third of the respondents shared my intuition that I (qua subject of the example) have no reason to purchase ITEM and that about two-thirds of respondents have the contrary intuition that I do have a reason to purchase ITEM. This doesn’t show that I’m wrong, but it does show that my intuition is not widely shared.

Now, here’s why this is important. In his excellent paper “Parfit’s Case against Subjectivism,” David Sobel argues that subjectivists – those who think that an agent’s reasons for action are all ultimately determined by the contingent pro and con attitudes that she would have under some procedurally specified conditions – can accept Parfit’s claim that we have current reasons to do what will prevent us from suffering future agony regardless of whether or not we have any current pro attitudes towards our avoiding future agony. Sobel argues that subjectivists will claim that anyone who will be in future agony will, in the future, necessarily have a future desire (when in agony) to get out of agony and so will, when in agony, have a reason to get out of agony. And he argues that, by appealing to this fact and what he calls the Reasons Transfer Principle, the subjectivist can hold not only that anyone who will be in future agony will have a future reason to get out of agony, but also that those who can avoid future agony have a present reason to avoid future agony. According to Sobel, the Reasons Transfer Principle (RTP) says: “If one will later have a reason to get O, then one now has a reason to facilitate the later getting of O.”

Monads announcement

If you like music, or philosophy, or philosophy-themed music, or giving away money, then you might be interested in this exciting announcement from the philosophy supergroup The 21st Century Monads!  Please be advised that some moral theories entail that you are morally required to purchase Monads music.

Avoiding Future Agony: Survey Says

I disagree with one of my fellow PEA Brains about something. Part of what our disagreement hinges upon is our differing intuitions about the following sort of case. Although it's clear that we have differing intuitions about this case, it's not clear whose intuitions are more widely shared. Of course, I don't think that because an intuition is widely shared that means that it must be true, but I do think how widely an intuition is shared among fellow philosophers does affect how persuasive certain arguments that rely on those intuitions will be. So here's a survey that tests people's intuitions.

http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/QGF6XDD

If you have the time, please take the survey. In a few days (after there have been several responses), I'll explain what the disagreement is and what of philosophical interests hangs on it. I post below the fold the set up for the survey in case people want to ask questions about it.

Conceptual Role Semantics and Reference

I’ve been reading David Enoch’s great Taking Morality Seriously. Enoch defends Robust Realism according to which there are judgment-independent non-natural (causally inert) normative properties. One of the objections to Robust Realism briefly discussed in the book is the problem of semantic access. Enoch is explicitly very modest when he responds to this objection (he merely explains how a response might go). I still want to raise a question about this response as I think that we are getting here into very deep and interesting questions about normative concepts and properties.

Ethics Discussions at PEA Soup: John Gardner and François Tanguay-Renaud's "Desert and Avoidability in Self-Defense" and Jeff McMahan's "Response," with commentary by Victor Tadros

We are pleased to present the latest installment of our partnership with Ethics, in which we host a discussion on one, or in this case more than one, article from each issue of the journal.  The articles selected from Volume 122, issue 1, are John Gardner and François Tanguay-Renaud's "Desert and Avoidability in Self-Defense" and Jeff McMahan's "Duty, Obedience, Desert, and Proportionality in War: A Response" (particularly section IV).  We are very grateful that Victor Tadros has agreed to provide the critical précis, which appears below the fold.

Ethics Discussions at PEA Soup: John Gardner and François Tanguay-Renaud's "Desert and Avoidability in Self-Defense" and Jeff McMahan's "Response," with commentary by Victor Tadros

(Moving to the front from Dec. 10)

We are pleased to announce the next installment in our collaboration with Ethics, where we host a discussion of one article from each issue of the journal, and the journal makes a copy of that article freely accessible (for a limited time) to our participants. 

Because the current issue (Volume 122, issue 1) features a symposium on Jeff McMahan's Killing in War, this time around we are focusing on two articles, John Gardner and François Tanguay-Renaud's "Desert and Avoidability in Self-Defense" and McMahan's reply.  Ethics has generously agreed to provide open access to both articles, which are now available here.  We are also pleased that our own Victor Tadros will provide a précis of the article to kick off the discussion.  Professor Tadros'  précis will appear, and discussion of the article will begin, Wednesday, January 4, 2012.