So the results are in. 63% of the respondents said that they would have most reason to refrain from making such significant sacrifices. 62% said that they would not be morally required to make such significant sacrifices. And 77% denied that the fact that the climate disaster would have been averted had, contrary to fact, everyone (or even just nearly everyone) been willing to make the significant sacrifices required to drastically reduce their carbon footprints constitutes a reason for them to make these sacrifices that is strong enough to outweigh the reasons that they have to avoid doing that which would be significantly detrimental to how they and their families fare.
This matches my intuitions. And the only point of these surveys was to verify that my intuitions are not out of whack with those of the majority, because I want to be able to appeal to them in an argument and rely on their having some persuasive force with the majority of my readers.
For those interested, the argument is that certain forms of rule consequentialism must reject moderate moral rationalism: the view that there is always sufficient reason to do what one is morally required to do. Clearly, certain forms of rule consequentialism require us to make significant sacrifices in this situation. For only a code that requires all (or nearly all) of us to make significant sacrifices in this situation would be one that if accepted and/or complied with by the vast majority of us would result in our averting climate disaster. And given how bad climate disaster is, it seems that the code with the highest expected value must include such a requirement. Thus, it seems that some forms of rule consequentialism require us to make significant sacrifices in this situation even though each of us lacks sufficient reason to fulfill this requirement. The source of the trouble, I suggest, is that whereas moral theories such as rule consequentialism make what I ought to do a function of what good consequences would result from all (or nearly all) of us acting a certain way irrespective of whether it’s in my power to ensure that sufficient others will act in this way, plausible theories of practical reason do not take what I have most or decisive reason to do to be a function of what good consequences would result from all (or nearly all) of us acting in a certain way irrespective of whether it’s in my power to ensure that sufficient others will act in this way. (By ‘ensure’, I don’t mean cause. If S is going to do X regardless of what I do, then I can, in the relevant sense, ensure that S will do X even though I do not cause S to do X.)