May will be a busy month here at the PEA Soup. After a discussion of Jennifer Hawkins's excellent paper on 5th of May, we have our first discussion of a Philosophers' Imprint paper scheduled for the end of the month. We'll be discussing Jack Woods's (Bilkent University) equally amazing critical examination of expressivism entitled 'Expressivism and Moore's Paradox'. This paper is freely available online (like all Imprint papers - just follow the link in the paper's title above). The discussion will be kicked off by a critical precis written by Teemu Toppinen from the University of Helsinki. His commentary will be posted online here at PEA Soup on Wednesday the 21st of May. I hope that you can join the the discussion!
This website is devoted to collecting information about women currently working in philosophy around the globe. This list includes information about women worldwide holding a Ph.D. or M.A. in philosophy who (1) has a job researching or teaching philosophy, (2) previously had a job in philosophy and is still active in philosophy, or (3) has published an article in a philosophy journal or a book in a philosophy list. Due to the purposes of the list, we have chosen not to include deceased philosophers or graduate students. Graduate students who have earned an M.A. but who have remained in a graduate program to complete a Ph.D. should wait until they have completed their highest degree before submitting their name for inclusion.
It is often thought that one central advantage of expressivism over subjectivism is that expressivism can make sense of moral disagreements. Whereas according to subjectivism, people end up talking past one another, expressivism enables speakers to express disagreements in attitude as Stevenson famously put it. This orthodoxy has been recently challenged in two ways. Subjectivists have tried to create new ways of making sense of disagreements, and it has turned out that the traditional expressivist accounts of disagreement are more problematic than previously thought. The latter issue has become even more pressing because of the negation problem. The questions of when two people disagree and when one person holds inconsistent attitudes seem to be very much the same question, and so many expressivists have thought that by giving an account of disagreement they can also give an account of inconsistency. In a recent paper entitled “Disagreement” (PPR) and in a corresponding chapter on disagreement in his new Impassionate Belief book, Mike Ridge has tried to develop a new account of disagreement (which he calls "disagreement in prescription") to solve these worries. I want to argue below that this account fails because it commits the conditional fallacy.
GOOD DONE RIGHT: a conference on effective altruism 7-9 July 2014, All Souls College, Oxford
Speakers include: Derek Parfit (Oxford), Thomas Pogge (Yale), Rachel Glennerster (MIT Poverty Action Lab), Nick Bostrom (Oxford), Norman Daniels (Harvard), Jeremy Lauer (WHO-CHOICE), Toby Ord (Oxford), William MacAskill (Cambridge), Larissa MacFarquhar (the New Yorker), Nick Beckstead (Oxford), Owen Cotton-Barratt (Oxford).
For further information and registration, please visit here.
For those of you interested in nonideal/ideal theory debates in political philosophy, I thought I’d let you know that Bowling Green State University is hosting a conference on the subject in three weeks. Registration is still open if you’re able to attend. We’re hoping to collect the papers in a volume following the conference. The line-up is great, and I expect the papers to advance the discussion.
It brings me great pleasure to introduce Cheshire Calhoun. Cheshire is Professor of Philosophy at Arizona State University, and Research Professor at the University of Arizona’s Center for the Philosophy of Freedom. Her work is extremely original, as I'm sure many Soupers will attest, covering a very wide range of areas including normative ethics, the emotions, feminist ethics, and gay and lesbian philosophy. Let's welcome Cheshire!