Welcome to our first Oxford Studies discussion, on John Brunero's "Cognitivism about Practical Rationality" (in OSME 9). The essay is available through this link for a few months, courtesy of OUP. Kieran Setiya has kindly contributed a commentary, below the fold. Please join us!
I'm excited to announce that we're starting a new series of discussions on PEA Soup, on various Oxford Studies volumes. The discussions will be modeled after our existing Ethics and JESP discussions.
For our first discussion, we'll be talking about John Brunero's essay "Cognitivism about Practical Rationality" in Oxford Studies in Metaethics Vol 9. The essay is available through this link for a few months, courtesy of OUP. Kieran Setiya has kindly contributed a commentary. Please join us on Sep 30 - Oct 2!
We're hoping to roll out some more discussions in the coming months, including on the new OSME 10 volume. Many thanks to the folks at OUP and to the volume editors for making this possible!
The Georgetown Institute for the Study of Markets and Ethics (GISME), located in Georgetown University’s McDonough School of Business, invites applications for the 2015 Junior Faculty Manuscript Workshop. The aim of the workshop is to provide critical feedback to junior scholars (i.e., junior faculty members, postdocs, or non-tenure-track professors) who are working on book-length manuscripts that address important normative issues related to the functioning of contemporary market societies.
A conference on the theme “Cultural Diversity & Liberal Democracy: Models, Policies and Practice” will be held at the Glendon School of Public and International Affairs, in Toronto, on April 19-20, 2016. Confirmed keynote speakers include David Miller (Oxford) and Alan Patten (Princeton). A call for presentations is attached. The deadline for submissions is November 1, 2015.
Please see below the fold for details. Queries should be directed to Kenneth McRoberts, the School’s Director, at firstname.lastname@example.org.
Policing and Prisons: Ethical and Political Questions about Law Enforcement and Incarceration
The Bowling Green Workshop in Applied Ethics and Public Policy will take place in Bowling Green, Ohio, March 11th-12th, 2015. Our keynote speaker is Douglas Husak (Rutgers). Those interested in presenting a paper are invited to submit a 2-3 page abstract (double-spaced) by November 1st, 2015.
Actualism, as I understand it, is the view according to which in determining what it is permissible to do at a time, t, one should consider only what would happen were one to do it and compare that with what would happen were one to do each of the other things one can do at t. Many object to Actualism (call this the Standard Objection) on the grounds that if it is true, then people are able to get out of present obligations in virtue of their potential future wrongdoing. That seems right to me. Actualists have a set of standard replies to this kind of argument, though. Mightn't there be a stronger objection to Actualism, however, one to which Actualists can't offer the same kind of replies that they do to the Standard Objection? I think there might. This objection is that Actualism seems to allow people to get out of having present moral obligations, not in virtue of their potential future wrongdoing, but, instead, in virtue of their potential future supererogatory behavior.