PEA Soup

A Dilemma for Subjectivism

Let’s say a theory in normative ethics is subjectivist just in case, according to it, what one ought to do is determined ultimately by the attitudes of some subject or group of subjects, such as the agent himself, the agent’s society, some ideal observer, or God.  So ordinary subjectivism, cultural relativism, ideal observer theory, and divine command theory are all forms of subjectivism.  Here’s a dilemma for such views.

(Sorry, this post is on the longer side.  But it is (I hope) easy reading – no fine points, nothing technical.)

Moral Status and the 4D View of Persons

Here’s a philosophical problem I’ve been thinking about lately.  The problem is that an ethical position I like conflicts with a metaphysical position I like.  On the one hand, human infants and adults enjoy full moral status whereas animals have lower moral status.  On the other hand, David Lewis’s view about the nature of persons is true (which is, in a nutshell, Four-Dimensionalism plus a Psychological Criterion of Personal Identity).  I don’t know if I can hold both of these positions.