PEA Soup

Moral Rationalism and Blameworthiness

I’m sympathetic to the following view, which I call moral rationalism:

MR: If S is morally required to do x, then S has decisive reason (all things considered) to do x.

One popular argument for this view appeals to blameworthiness. This sort of argument is found both in Darwall (2006, 287-292) and in Skorupski (1999, 170) as well as in Shafer-Landau (2003, 190-193), although Shafer-Landau employs it to argue for only weak moral rationalism:

WMR: If S is morally required to do x, then S has a (pro tanto) reason to do x.

The following is my reconstruction of their argument.

Logic Help

Consider: 

(1) If x is morally wrong and S freely does x, then S is blameworthy for doing x.
(2) If x is rationally optimal, then S is not blameworthy for freely doing x.
(3) Therefore, if x is morally wrong, then x is not rationally optimal.

Skorupski (1999, 170) claims that we can derive (3) from (1) and (2). Intuitively, this seems right, but how exactly is the derivation supposed to go? My logic is a bit rusty.

Welcome, Simon Kirchin!

We are pleased to announce that Simon Kirchin has accepted our invitation to become a contributor here at PEA Soup.  Simon is a Senior Lecturer in Philosophy and Director of Learning and Teaching for the School of European Culture and Languages at the University of Kent. He is also the Treasurer of the British Society for Ethical Theory, which is the leading society in the UK for moral philosophy, and an Associate Editor of Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. His research interests are mainly in metaethics and normative ethics, but also include aesthetics, metaphysics, epistemology, medical ethics, and political philosophy. It's great to have you aboard, Simon!

Welcome, Simon Keller!

We are pleased to announce that Simon Keller has accepted our invitation to become a contributor here at PEA Soup.  Simon is presently a Senior Research Fellow at CAPPE at the University of Melbourne and an Adjunct Assistant Professor at Boston University, and he is slated to join the Philosophy Program at Victoria University of Wellington as an Associate Professor.  His book, The Limits of Loyalty, has recently come out, and he works on such topics as patriotism, love, and welfare (among others).  It's great to have you aboard, Simon!

The Too Demanding Objection

There are at least two possible ways we might conceive of the too demanding objection: (1) a moral theory is too demanding if it demands more of us than commonsense morality demands of us (that is, if its demands conflict with our commonsense moral intuitions) or (2) a moral theory is too demanding if it demands more of us than we have sufficient reason to give. When philosophers claim that act-utilitarianism is too demanding are they claiming that it is too demanding in sense (1), sense (2), or both? Which version of the objection is more powerful? Can you think of any instances in which commonsense morality seems too demanding? If so, that would speak in favor of (2). I’ve thought of perhaps two examples. First, commonsense morality seems to include the idea that we should (almost) never leave a man behind—that is, we should try to rescue someone even if the expected costs of our doing so far exceed the expected benefits. Think here of the movie Black Hawk Down. Second, commonsense morality seems to condemn Gauguin’s abandoning his family to live and paint in Tahiti. But I think that in both instances commonsense morality demands more from these agents than they have sufficient reason to give and is for that reason objectionable. I’m not entirely happy with these examples though. Can anyone else think of better examples?

Three Cheers for These PEA Brains!

In lieu of the customary "here-are-some-amazing-statistics-about-PEA-Soup" birthday message, we thought it would be better to post a "Yearbook" to share some good things that have happened to some of our fellow PEA brains over this past year.  A lot of good news appears below the fold.  If there is any more good news that should be shared, by all means please add it in the comments section.

A Bleg: Obligation Dilemmas

As I understand it, an obligation dilemma exists where an agent faces a choice situation in which two (or more) of her available act alternatives are morally obligatory and yet it is impossible for her to perform both of those two act alternatives. Does anyone know of a moral theory or a moral theorist that endorses the existence of obligation dilemmas? Do you think that the divine command theory allows for obligation dilemmas in that it seems possible for God to command an agent to perform both of two mutually exclusive act alternatives? If the divine command theory does allow for the possibility of obligation dilemmas is this a good reason to reject the theory?

Conference Announcement and CFP: Thick Concepts

THICK CONCEPTS: University of Kent, Canterbury, UK 3rd-5th July, 2009.

Welcome Brad Cokelet!

We are pleased to announce that Brad Cokelet has accepted our invitation to be a contributor here at PEA Soup. Brad is currently finishing his dissertation entitled Virtue, Rational Agency, and Respect for Persons at Northwestern University and will be starting as an Assistant Professor at the University of Miami in the fall. He works on normative ethics, moral psychology, and the history of ethics. His paper “Ideal Agency and the Possibility of Error” has just come out in the latest issue of Ethics. We are very pleased to have him on board.

Welcome Dale Miller!

We are pleased to announce that Dale Miller has accepted our invitation to be a contributor here at PEA Soup.  Dale is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Co-Director of the Institute for Ethics and Public Affairs at Old Dominion University, and specializes in history of ethics (especially Mill), ethical theory (especially consequentialism), and social-political philosophy.  It's great to have you aboard, Dale!