We're very pleased to kick off our discussion of Cécile Fabre'sEthics paper, "War Exit." Helen Frowe has written a critical précis, which you can find below the fold. We're looking forward to a great discussion.
We're very pleased to announce that, tomorrow, Thursday May 7, we'll be kicking off our next discussion of a paper published in Ethics -- Cécile Fabre's piece, "War Exit." Helen Frowe has written a critical précis to open the discussion. So stay tuned!
We are very happy to kick off another PEA Soup celebration of the Ethics 125th anniversary retrospective series, with this special feature of R. Lanier Anderson'sessay on Marjorie Grene's "Authenticity: an Existential Virtue." And, as an additional bonus, Professor Anderson has kindly offered us some background about Grene's life and work (below the fold). Enjoy! And hope to hear our readers' reactions in the comments.
Helen Frowe wrote me yesterday to try to understand better my position on how to count the agent’s interest in a trolley switching case. The text she was trying to understand was a piece I co-wrote with David Wasserman, called “Agents, Impartiality, and the Priority of Claims Over Duties; Diagnosing Why Thomson Still Gets the Trolley Problem Wrong by Appeal to the ‘Mechanics of Claims,’” Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (2012). Thinking about how to answer her brought me to consider an interesting case I hadn’t really thought about before. So I post it here on Pea Soup to invite replies to my tentative read on how to handle this case.
Consider the question “Can regret be appropriate even apart from any belief that one’s choice was misguided or irrational if a monistic theory of the good is true?” According to the relevant notion of regret, regretting is to be understood, roughly, as mourning the loss of a forgone good. This notion of regret leaves room for the possibility that there may be cases of rational regret that do not involve the agent seeing her prior choice as in some way misguided. It is commonly held that this can easily occur when there is a plurality of distinct kinds of goods at stake. More controversial is the suggestion (which can be found in Hurka’s work) that this can also easily occur when there is only one distinct kind of good at stake. According to Hurka (“Monism, Pluralism, and Rational Regret”), goods with different “intrinsic properties” can be distinct “in the way that matters for rational regret” without being goods of distinct kinds, and so monistic theories of the good can accommodate “rational regret” as well as pluralistic theories. But it might be, and indeed has been, argued (by, in particular, Stocker (Plural and Conflicting Values)) that, insofar as different intrinsic properties can be distinct in the way that matters for rational regret, we can think of the different properties as tied to different values, and so we do not have a case of rational ‘monistic’ regret. And here we seem to reach a stalemate grounded in what seems to be something like a terminological issue, namely whether to count a theory of the good that takes say, pleasure, as the only good as monistic, if it also allows for distinct kinds of pleasure that make room for rational regret. I am trying to develop a position that gets beyond this stalemate, but am now wondering whether my characterization of stalemate seems fair or if there is a better interpretation of the dynamic of the debate that makes the dispute seem more substantial.
We continue our celebration of the 125th anniversary year of Ethics by discussing Alexander Guerrero's retrospective of Marie Collins Swabey's "Publicity and Measurement," as well as the original paper by Swabey. Guerrero's retrospective is available here, Swabey's paper is available here; both are open access.
Guerrero has also kindly written for us a terrific overview of Swabey's work and life, posted below the fold. Join in the discussion!
Please join us in discussing Derek Baker and Jack Woods' paper "How Expressivists Can and Should Explain Inconsistency," available open access here. Mark Schroeder opens the discussion with a critical précis below the fold.
We have two exciting Ethics discussions coming up:
On January 26-28, we discuss Derek Baker and Jack Woods' paper "How Expressivists Can and Should Explain Inconsistency," available open access here. Mark Schroeder has kindly agreed to open the discussion with a critical précis.
On February 2-4, we continue our celebration of the 125th anniversary year of Ethics by discussing Alexander Guerrero's retrospective of Marie Collins Swabey's "Publicity and Measurement," as well as the original paper by Swabey. Guerrero's retrospective is available open access here. Swabey's paper is available here, and can be read online for free.
Join us for what should be really interesting discussions!