PEA Soup

Kant, Well-being, and Happiness

I’m intrigued by Kant’s remarks on happiness and well-being. I’ve been thinking of the traditional understanding of his view and a passage we’ve discussed in a reading group on the Second Critique. I’m left with jigsaw puzzle where I cannot seem to make all the parts fit. I would be thankful for any help.

 

G. E. Moore and his young godson

There’s a story that I heard from my father many years ago, which I’m tempted to share with PEA Soupers. G. E. Moore was a Cambridge friend and contemporary of my great-grandfather Ralph L. Wedgwood (1874-1956), and so when my grandfather John H. Wedgwood (1907-1989) was born, Moore agreed to be his godfather.

According to the story, my grandfather, then a small boy, had the following conversation with Moore, while Moore was visiting my great-grandparents’ house for a couple of days.

Small boy: What are you doing, Mr Moore?

Moore (earnestly): I’m writing a book, about the meaning of the word ‘good’.

Small boy: You mean, like when we say that something’s “gone for good”?

Moore (taken aback): Oh! I hadn’t thought of that!

The trouble with this story is that I really doubt that it’s true.

Does Mill believe in discontinuities?

As we all know, J. S. Mill claims that pleasures differ from each other, not only in quantity, but also in quality. Many commentators have read Mill as making the following two claims: 

1. Pleasures fall into two disjoint categories -- the "higher" pleasures and the "lower" pleasures.
2. There is a radical discontinuity between these two categories -- there is no amount (however large) of the lower-quality pleasures that can be more valuable than any amount (however small) of the higher-quality pleasures.

I believe that such discontinuity claims are intrinsically implausible. But that is not what I want to argue here. What I shall argue here is that there is no evidence that Mill made this second claim (2).

The Early Modern Philosophy Curriculum

Many philosophy departments require a course in the history of (usually early) modern philosophy for their majors.  My impression of the way such courses are usually taught is that they focus on metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of mind:  the metaphysics of substances; the epistemology of empiricism versus rationalism, both of which are classically foundationalist; ideas, impressions, and other varieties of sense data in the philosophy of mind. I imagine that this curriculum was set back in the mid-twentieth century, when M&E was considered “real” philosophy.  But nowadays, it strikes me as bizarre.

A Puzzle: The Groundwork and the Golden Rule

Ever since I first read Kant’s Groundwork, I have been struck by a puzzle that I have never seen adequately explained.

In a footnote in Section 2 (G 430n), Kant makes some rather dismissive remarks about the Golden Rule (he calls it “the trivial quod tibi non vis fieri etc.”). At best, he argues, this “trivial” Rule is a consequence of the Categorical Imperative, and it holds only “with various qualifications”. It cannot be a “universal law”, for three reasons: it obviously cannot ground our duties towards ourselves; it cannot ground our imperfect duties towards others (since a fortunate person might well prefer not to be helped by others, in exchange for his not being obliged to help them); and it also cannot ground our perfect (or “owed”) duties to others (since if the judge were in the criminal’s shoes, he would prefer not to be punished as he deserves).

But surely Kant knew that this “trivial” Golden Rule comes from the Sermon on the Mount: “Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them: for this is the law and the prophets” (Matthew 7:12). How can Kant have been so dismissive of such a central part of Christ’s ethical teaching?

A Nietzsche Question

Given that Leiter has put up a kind link to Pea Soup, I thought it would be appropriate to thank him by posting something about Nietzsche. The question I have in mind is simple really; what is the first essay of On the Genealogy of Morals a historical account of? Is it an account of (i) the concept ‘good’, the term/word ‘good’, and the nature of evaluative judgments, or of (ii) different conceptions and ideas of good, which values (i.e., evaluative attitudes) different groups have held, their methods of making evaluative judgments, their grounds for making these judgments, and so on. Roughly the question is, is his account ‘historico-conceptual’ or ‘historico-psychological’?

            Given the text, Nietzsche seems to think it is both. It doesn’t look like he made the distinction and I haven’t seen any commentator doing it either. I want to claim that his account is a non-starter for an account of (i) whereas at least it is a runner for an account of (ii).

New Hobbes blog

Sharon Lloyd, the noted Hobbes scholar, has started a new blog, Hobbes Today, focusing on Hobbes' moral and political philosophy.  There are already intriguing posts about Hobbes' theories of human nature and of political sovereignty, and given the usual quality of Sharon's work, I'm sure that the level of discussion will be high.

Calls for Papers: Emotions, American ethical tradition

Studies in the History of Ethics has announced calls for papers for two future symposia. Details follow.

Perfectionism, Hedonism, and Hume

Dale Miller's recent post on Mill's theory of value (and subsequent discussion) was quite enlightening. And it set me thinkin' about qualitative hedonism and perfectionism, and in particular the relationship between them. During our previous discussion, we appeared to be treating "Mill is a hedonist" and "Mill is a perfectionist" as mutually exclusive (or, at least, I was). I wonder if this isn't a mistake. And I wonder if it isn't possible to read one of Mill's sentimentalist forbears, viz., David Hume, as a person who holds both views. (Sorry, this post might be a little long. And sorry also if it reads like a collection of notes scribbled on a napkin; basically, it is.)

Mill's Theory of Value

In the comments on Jussi's thread, a side discussion developed about Mill's theory of value.  Dale Dorsey indicated that he has concluded that Mill is not a hedonist.  I'm inclined to defend the claim that he is.  I'm not prepared to defend hedonism, and so I think that considerations of charity favor ascribing a different view to him, but I think the textual evidence is strong enough that we just have to say that Mill got this one wrong.  Of course, the first piece of evidence for me to cite is the following passage from Utilitarianism II2: