I'm really enjoying Scanlon's new book "Being Realistic About Reasons" (all citations below to this book), but I'm stumbling on the part about pure normative truths and the explanation of supervenience. Any help would be much appreciated.
Happy Bastille Day! One more post for N and M month.
Some Kantians make a lot of the fact that often, when we are being moral, we don’t feel like we want to do the right thing, but we do it. Korsgaard openly ridicules the view that a good person actually wants to do the right thing, calling it “the good dog” picture of the virtuous person. Suppose we want to say desire is the source of all worthy motivation. We then need to explain why doing the right because you desire the right can feel so damn different from drinking coffee because you desire coffee.
I’ll try and sketch an explanation, and incidentally defend both happy, doglike good-doing (sometimes) and dour good-doing (sometimes).
2014 Conference – November 6-9, 2014 Practical Reason, Moral Judgment and Moral Sense, Sensibility and Sentiment in the Moral Life
Call For Abstracts
The 2014 Tennessee Value and Agency “TVA” Conference will take place November 6-9, 2014, on the University of Tennessee Campus, 1210 McClung Tower. The conference will focus on (rethinking) the relationships between practical reason, moral judgment and moral sense, sensibility and sentiment in the moral life, with an eye toward bringing structure and clarity to the aims and ambitions of current work in moral psychology and moral theory. Keynote speakers will be Amelie Rorty (Tufts) and Talbot Brewer (UVA).
Just a quick reminder that on Thursday the 22nd of May we'll start the online discussion on Jack Woods's wonderful Philosophers' Imprint article "Expressivism and Moore's Paradox" (please follow the link in the title to the article itself) here at Pea Soup. This discussion will begin with Teemu Toppinen's critical introduction which will appear at this blog on Thursday. I hope you can take part!
Edit: We have moved the date of this discussion by one day to the 22nd because of the problems there were with typepad on Monday. Our apologies and thanks for your patience.
May will be a busy month here at the PEA Soup. After a discussion of Jennifer Hawkins's excellent paper on 5th of May, we have our first discussion of a Philosophers' Imprint paper scheduled for the end of the month. We'll be discussing Jack Woods's (Bilkent University) equally amazing critical examination of expressivism entitled 'Expressivism and Moore's Paradox'. This paper is freely available online (like all Imprint papers - just follow the link in the paper's title above). The discussion will be kicked off by a critical precis written by Teemu Toppinen from the University of Helsinki. His commentary will be posted online here at PEA Soup on Wednesday the 21st of May. I hope that you can join the the discussion!
It is often thought that one central advantage of expressivism over subjectivism is that expressivism can make sense of moral disagreements. Whereas according to subjectivism, people end up talking past one another, expressivism enables speakers to express disagreements in attitude as Stevenson famously put it. This orthodoxy has been recently challenged in two ways. Subjectivists have tried to create new ways of making sense of disagreements, and it has turned out that the traditional expressivist accounts of disagreement are more problematic than previously thought. The latter issue has become even more pressing because of the negation problem. The questions of when two people disagree and when one person holds inconsistent attitudes seem to be very much the same question, and so many expressivists have thought that by giving an account of disagreement they can also give an account of inconsistency. In a recent paper entitled “Disagreement” (PPR) and in a corresponding chapter on disagreement in his new Impassionate Belief book, Mike Ridge has tried to develop a new account of disagreement (which he calls "disagreement in prescription") to solve these worries. I want to argue below that this account fails because it commits the conditional fallacy.
Do you enjoy puzzles? Yeah? Well then, let me share one with you.John Basl (Northeastern University) and I have had some fruitful conversations about it; and we have some views about how to address it (and some views about how not to); but in the spirit of collective inquiry and intellectual theft let me take this opportunity to solicit your initial responses.
The puzzle might be construed either in terms of rationality or theoretical justification, but it is roughly as follows:
Why are we permitted to revise our moral/normative/evaluative beliefs in light of non-moral beliefs but not vice versa?
Indeed, while it’s clear we are often guilty of sub-consciously shaping the facts to fit our evaluative commitments (e.g. the powerful correlations between political ideology “climate skepticism”, 911 conspiracy theories, and beliefs about the president’s religion and birthplace), we all disavow this a proper way to form our non-moral beliefs.As obvious as this may seem, the puzzle is how to best explain why this is so and then sorting out what the implications may be for meta-ethics, moral epistemology, and even epistemology more generally....