This is definitely work in progress, if you can call it that.
Tim Schroeder and I have defended a view according to which even though virtuous people seem different from the rest of us in many ways, it basically comes down to a difference in desires. A person who has a deep intrinsic desire for the right and the good de re (or desires for the various things that are right and good) is as a result not only disposed to act differently but also has a different mental life in many ways, emotional and cognitive. For the purpose of this post, though, it doesn’t matter if we talk about what we intrinsically desire or what we care about as long as we assume neither is a cognitive state.
I would like develop this view further, with attention to questions I keep getting.
One is :“if a virtuous person does the right thing out of a desire, how come she often feels a sense of duty, not desire?” Warning: I plan to post my answer soon!
Other questions concern the phronimos, but I have no view about the phronimos, only about the good person.