PEA Soup

Knowability of moral truths again

In the previous post, I applied Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument to argue for the claim that there must be some moral truths that cannot be known. Now I want to look at one of the best arguments against the view at the other end of the scale – that all moral truths could be unknowable. I will use basic act-consequentialism as an example. Yet, similar problems would be faced by Rossians who think that we can never know the over-all ‘duty proper’ in particular circumstances and by contractualists whose view would imply that we can never know which principles are non-rejectable because we cannot know what kind of standpoints the principles create for individuals. The argument is an application of Wright’s Wittgenstein. It is based on the idea that, if all moral truths turned out to be unknowable, it is not clear whether anything would count as intending to do the right action because it is right.

A moral equivalent of Moore's paradox?

So here's an idea I've been fiddling with for a while and would be interested to hear if anyone thinks that further exploration of this idea would be fruitful. (I'm also trying out this line of thought later this month at the ETMP conference in Amsterdam, so I wouldn't mind some 'pre-feedback' before my presentation.)

I assume most of us are familiar with examples of Moore's paradox:
    (P) It's raining, but I don't believe it

Peter Railton (in the paper "Moral factualism" that he wrote for the Blackwell moral theory anthology edited by PEA Souper Jamie Dreier) suggests that there are moral equivalents of Moore's paradox:
    (Q) Hurting animals for fun is wrong, but I don't care

Beliefs are not necessary for motivation

Many philosophers think that whenever we are motivated to act, our motivation always involves a belief. E.g. according to the version of the Humean Theory of Motivation that is defended by Michael Smith, your motivation for action always consists of a desire and a "means-end belief" (see The Moral Problem, p. 92).

I think this is false. There are cases in which for no further reason, you simply form an intention to perform a certain basic action right now. Then I think that this intention can motivate you to act, without the need for any "means-end belief" at all.

Moral Psychology Conference at the University of San Francisco

For people in the Bay Area, or those interested in making a trip to it, there will be a small conference entitled "Mind, Agency, and Emotion: New Perspectives on Moral Psychology" held at the University of San Francisco on November 9th and 10th.

Speakers will include Chrisoula Andreou, John Doris, Anne Jacobson, Jeanette Kennett, Benoit Monin, Shaun Nichols, Jenefer Robinson, and Christine Swanton.

For more information, go here:
http://www.usfca.edu/fac-staff/mrvargas/Conferences/Indexical/MP/Program.html

a problem for (some) hybrid theories

According to some (but not all) 'hybrid' metaethical theories, moral sentences like 'stealing is wrong' express both beliefs and desires, but different beliefs for different speakers.  I think Paul Edwards was a forebear of this position, but it has recently been defended by Stephen Barker and Michael Ridge.

I understand these kinds of views to work something as follows: every speaker is assumed to have some property, P, such that she disapproves of P-actions.  Then, for any given speaker, S, who disapproves of P-actions, 'Stealing is wrong' expresses the belief that stealing is P, and expresses disapproval of P-actions. 

Zombies and Metaethics

I’d like to return to one of the favourite topics of Pea Soup for a bit, i.e., the Zombies. Couple of years ago we had great discussions about Zombies, well-being, and the notion of ‘good for’ (here, here, and here). We’ve even talked about whether it would be wrong to eat Zombies (here). I’m actually quite fond of the Zombies discussed in the philosophy of mind. For this reason, I’d like to put on the table a slightly more general question about what implications, if any, the conceivability arguments and their conclusions would have for metaethics.

Because I Have To

One venerable objection against the principle that all motivation derives from desire points to the motive of duty, or practical necessity, as phenomenological evidence of its falsity. Supposedly, the experience of doing something because you have to (or, per Kant, the experience of being able to do something because you have to) is qualitatively distinct from the experience of doing something motivated by desire.

I think, however, that this phenomenological character of the motive of duty can be explained in a way fully compatible with the Motivation-by-Desire Principle. Here I'll try to explain how. In part, what I'm looking for from this post (other than the usual insightful criticism from fellow Pea-Soupers) is a sense of whether this project is interesting enough to spend any time on.

Shoemaker on Moral Responsibilty and Moral Ignorance

It is often  supposed that people are not morally responsible for their behavior when that behavior is the product of non-culpable ignorance, but the issue becomes considerably more complex when the ignorance in question is concerned only with moral truths.  Suppose that an agent knows all of the relevant non-moral facts but simply fails to know the moral truths that would allow her to figure out that a particular action is wrong.  Is she morally responsible for her action? 

Unfortunately for those who think that this question admits of an easy answer, our own David Shoemaker has just conducted a dazzling experimental study that raises some very interesting and difficult new philosophical issues here. 

First, he presented subjects with a case modeled on Susan Wolf's story of JoJo:

JoJo is the favorite son of Jo the First, an evil and sadistic dictator of a small, undeveloped country, entirely cut off from the outside world. Because of his father’s special feelings for the boy, JoJo is given a special education and is allowed to accompany his father and observe his daily routine. In light of this treatment, little JoJo, who worships his father (as most boys do), takes his father as a role model and develops values just like his dad’s. As an adult, JoJo does the same sorts of things his father did, including sending people to prison or to death or to torture chambers on the basis of whim. He does these things because he sincerely believes they are morally right, and he is aware of no reason to think otherwise. One day, a peasant sneezes as JoJo walks by, so JoJo heads over to the peasant and punches him in the face, just like his father would have done. He feels no guilt afterwards.

Other subjects were presented with a case exactly like this one except that it described  JoJo  as having all of the relevant moral knowledge.  Just as one might expect, subjects thought that JoJo was less morally blameworthy when they were told that he suffered from moral ignorance than they were when they were told that he had the relevant moral knowledge.  So far, no surprises. 

But now comes the surprising part.  In another condition, Shoemaker presented subjects with a story in which JoJo's action is morally praiseworthy:

 

JoJo is the favorite son of Jo the First, an evil and sadistic dictator of a small, undeveloped country, entirely cut off from the outside world. Because of his father’s special feelings for the boy, JoJo is given a special education and is allowed to accompany his father and observe his daily routine. In light of this treatment, little JoJo, who worships his father (as most boys do), takes his father as a role model and develops values just like his dad’s. As an adult, he does the same sorts of things his father did, including sending people to prison or to death or to torture chambers on the basis of whim. He does these things because he sincerely believes they are morally right, and he is aware of no reason to think otherwise. One day, a peasant sneezes as JoJo walks by, so JoJo heads over to the peasant to punch him in the face, just like his father would have done. As he’s pulling back his fist, though, he suddenly feels compassion and discovers that he can’t bring himself to punch the peasant, even though he still believes it’s the right thing to do. He thus backs away and lets the peasant go free, even though he believes that doing so is immoral, and he feels quite guilty afterwards.

Here again, the intuitions of  subjects who received this story could be compared with intuitions of subjects who received a story that was almost exactly the same except that JoJo had all of the relevant knowledge.  But this time, there was no difference in moral judgments.  Subjects thought that JoJo was no less praiseworthy when he didn't know he was doing the right thing as when he did know.   

In other words, there seems to be an asymmetry such that moral ignorance makes people think an agent is less blameworthy but does not make people think the agent is less praiseworthy.  I actually find myself having the very same intuitions, but it's hard to see exactly why this asymmetry is arising.  Is there some more general principle from which all of the intuitions we see here can be derived?

Best of Michael Smith

I'm unsuccesfully trying to have a break from blogging to get some work done. I cannot resist the temptation to advertise a book review of Smith's Ethics and the A Priori collection available HERE . It's by Constantine Sandis. By far the funniest review I've ever read and also among one of the best. Enjoy!

Happiness on MSNBC

Check out this interview on MSNBC with Psychiatrist Dr. Donald E. Rosen, conducted by MSNBC health editor Jane Weaver. I’m breaking it down FJM-style.