PEA Soup

The Too Demanding Objection

There are at least two possible ways we might conceive of the too demanding objection: (1) a moral theory is too demanding if it demands more of us than commonsense morality demands of us (that is, if its demands conflict with our commonsense moral intuitions) or (2) a moral theory is too demanding if it demands more of us than we have sufficient reason to give. When philosophers claim that act-utilitarianism is too demanding are they claiming that it is too demanding in sense (1), sense (2), or both? Which version of the objection is more powerful? Can you think of any instances in which commonsense morality seems too demanding? If so, that would speak in favor of (2). I’ve thought of perhaps two examples. First, commonsense morality seems to include the idea that we should (almost) never leave a man behind—that is, we should try to rescue someone even if the expected costs of our doing so far exceed the expected benefits. Think here of the movie Black Hawk Down. Second, commonsense morality seems to condemn Gauguin’s abandoning his family to live and paint in Tahiti. But I think that in both instances commonsense morality demands more from these agents than they have sufficient reason to give and is for that reason objectionable. I’m not entirely happy with these examples though. Can anyone else think of better examples?

Personal Constraints?

A personal constraint is a constraint on action that arises from certain associative relations, such as kinship, friendship, etc. Typically, they are injunctions to treat one's personal relations with a certain form of priority over strangers even if, for instance, not doing so would promote more good overall. One could construe this as a constraint on rational action, viz., that any action that disobeyed such a constraint is all-things-considered irrational, or as a moral constraint, that any action that disobeyed such a constraint is all-things-considered immoral. (I'll leave this question open.) Personal constraints differ from personal options. I might have an option to treat my wife with a certain priority in the face of a greater good elsewhere, but I need not do so--in a conflict case I could also be justified in acting for the greater good. Personal constraints deny that one can be justified in refusing to act with priority to one's associates. Do such constraints exist? I want very briefly to run an argument up the flagpole that they do not.

Act-Utilitarianism and the Contrary-to-Reason Objection

The following argument was inspired by the excellent work of two fellow PEA Brains: David Sobel’s “The Impotence of the Demandingness Objection” and Dale Dorsey’s “Weak Anti-Rationalism and the Demandingness of Morality”:

Contractualism, Rule-Consequentialism, and Animals

I’m a contractualist. There – I’ve said it. My supervisor Brad Hooker is the rule-consequentialist. You might think that we have endless debates about which of the closely resembling views is right. Unfortunately we have better things to do. But, I do want to explain why his main argument based on the moral status of animals against contractualism fails to convert me into a rule-consequentialist.

Specificationism

There’s an approach to a number of different domains in ethics, which we can call “specificationism”, that is seldom explicitly discussed but that I think warrants greater attention. Easily the most famous example of specificationism is found in the theory of rights and is owed to Thomson’s “A Defense of Abortion”, where she argues that no one has a right not to be killed simpliciter, only a right not to be killed unjustly. The basic idea is that the content of the right not to be killed – or indeed any right if we wish to generalize – must be specified to reflect what may and may not be done to the right-holder. The right not to be killed may clearly prohibit killing in some uncontroversial cases, but according to this picture it is rife with qualifications that reflect the many instances where one may be permissibly killed. This is a thumbnail sketch of a specified conception of rights, but the theory of rights is only one of the domains where the strategy of specification is employed.

Doubts about Morality

Many philosophers draw a distinction between moral and non-moral reasons for action, or motives, such that questions like, “Are moral reasons always overriding?” and “Can I have reason to do what I morally ought not do?” make sense. Not all philosophers draw this distinction:  Aristotle is the most obvious example. 

My main question is whether it is a useful or important distinction.  First, what is the distinction between moral and non-moral reasons for action?  Is there some consensus on this I am unaware of?  Second, why draw this distinction?

Trolley problems come in degrees

Like many other philosophers, I reject consequentialism in favour of a more deontological approach to ethics. That is, I favour a moral theory that implies that in certain cases, one ought to refrain from harming people in certain ways – even if, from an impartial agent-neutral perspective, the world as a whole would be a better place if one did harm those people in those ways. The notorious “trolley problem” is one good way to try to understand just what principles underlie these agent-relative, deontological restrictions:

Five people are trapped on the railway track, and a runaway railway trolley is hurtling towards them. In this case, it seems permissible to divert the trolley away from the main track (where it will crush five people), onto a side track where it will crush only one person. On the other hand, it does not seem permissible to push an innocent bystander onto the railway track so that after smashing into him, the trolley will grind to a halt before it can reach the five people who are trapped further down the track.

Pluralist Universalism

In his new book, Moral Value and Human Diversity, Robert Audi introduces a brand-new ethical theory called pluralist universalism. It is not altogether new but rather an original collage of some of the existing ethical theories. He doesn’t much argue for the view or explain how it is supposed to work in practice. Anyway, I thought it would be worth introducing here. I would be interested to hear what everyone makes of it. I’m going to end with one worry I have.

Is equality good?

Welfare Egalitarianism (hereafter, Egalitarianism) is the view that it is intrinsically good for people to be equally well off. Or more generally: it is intrinsically better for people to be more nearly equal in welfare.

Survey question for curiosity: how many readers think that's true? How many find the claim intuitively obvious? (Think of your answer before reading the rest.)

Following is an argument against Egalitarianism that I'd like to hear comments on. It uses some premises from population axiology:

• The Unrepugnant Premise: For possible worlds x and y, if y has a lower population than x, a higher average utility, a higher total utility, and a perfectly equal distribution of utility, then y is better than x.
• The Benign Addition Principle: If worlds x and y are so related that y would be the result of increasing the utility of everyone in x by some amount and adding some new people with worthwhile lives, then y is better than x.
• Transitivity: If z is better than y and y is better than x, then z is better than x.

Schapiro on Kantian Rigorism

In her very good article in the latest Ethics (117, Oct. ’06), “Kantian Rigorism and Mitigating Circumstances,” Tamar Schapiro brings to light a problem with the standard Kantian line for dealing with the flexibility of moral rules, in particular the rule against deception.

On the one hand, the standard line holds that deception is wrong (by Kantian lights) by virtue of facts intrinsic to deception itself—it is manipulative, interferes with another’s autonomy etc.—which seems to entail the rigorist conclusion that deception would be wrong no matter what the circumstances. On the other hand, Kantians often say that in some circumstances deception is permissible (suggesting that it is not merely facts intrinsic to deception itself that make deception wrong). How can this tension be resolved?