The UPDirectory publicizes information about philosophers who are members of traditionally underrepresented groups in philosophy. The purpose of the directory is to provide an easy-to-use resource for anyone who wants to learn more about the work of philosophers who belong to underrepresented groups within the discipline.
I am happy to announce that our next featured philosopher, Charles Mills, will have a post up on PEA soup a week from today. Professor Mills is the John Evans Professor of Moral and Intellectual Philosophy at Northwestern and his post will be titled "Black Radical Liberalism (and why it isn't an oxymoron)." Please stop by next Monday to read the post and join the discussion!
The deadline for submissions to OSPP is March 15th. Scholars within 15 years of earning their Ph.D. or in graduate school can also enter the Marc Sanders Prize competition. Details here. The conference takes place at Syracuse University September 18th-20th, 2015. Speakers will include: Elizabeth Anderson (keynote), Seana Shiffrin (keynote), Richard Miller, Michael Otsuka, George Sher, and Kit Wellman.
I hope Ralph won't mind if I piggyback on his post, but I'm just getting started on a paper that's partly about normative necessity, and I thought I'd get the old juices flowing with some PEA Soup discussion. (Plus it's February and my name starts with a D!)
In “Varieties of Necessity” (in Gendler and Hawthorne, Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford 2002), Kit Fine argued that we need to recognize that certain normative truths are in a sense necessary, and that the kind of necessity in question is sui generis, rather than being a special case of metaphysical necessity.
I shall not dispute Fine’s argument for the conclusion that there are normative necessities. However, I shall dispute his argument for the conclusion that these normative necessities are sui generis. On the contrary, as I shall argue, Fine does not give us a compelling reason to deny that normative necessity is a species of metaphysical necessity.
We continue our celebration of the 125th anniversary year of Ethics by discussing Alexander Guerrero's retrospective of Marie Collins Swabey's "Publicity and Measurement," as well as the original paper by Swabey. Guerrero's retrospective is available here, Swabey's paper is available here; both are open access.
Guerrero has also kindly written for us a terrific overview of Swabey's work and life, posted below the fold. Join in the discussion!
Lying is an important social and moral category. We react negatively to liars and their lies. But what is it to lie? The standard view in philosophy and social science is that a lie is a dishonest assertion. This view goes all the way back to at least the 4th century, when Augustine wrote, “He may say a true thing and yet lie, if he thinks it to be false and utters it for true.” On this view, lying is a purely psychological act: it does not require your assertion to be objectively false, only that you believe it is false.
About two years ago, my son Angelo came across an expression of the standard view of lying. He wondered whether it fit the ordinary concept of lying. (You might be able to imagine the sort of dinnertime conversations that could lead a twelve-year-old to become curious on this point.) In particular, Angelo was interested in whether, on the ordinary view, lying was a purely psychological act. So we conducted some behavioral experiments to find out.
Please join us in discussing Derek Baker and Jack Woods' paper "How Expressivists Can and Should Explain Inconsistency," available open access here. Mark Schroeder opens the discussion with a critical précis below the fold.