Please join us to discuss Preston Greene & Meghan Sullivan's "Against Time Bias," published in the most recent issue of Ethics and available open access here. Caspar Hare has kindly contributed a critical précis, below the fold. It should be an exciting discussion!
Syracuse University will host The International Association for the Philosophy of Death and Dying Conference May 18-20, 2016. There is a call for papers. Submission deadline: November 1, 2015. Keynotes will be Frances Kamm and Shelly Kagan.
The Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy series, published by Oxford University Press and edited by Tania Lombrozo, Joshua Knobe, and Shaun Nichols, is now calling for papers for its second volume.
We're excited to announce our next Ethics discussion on Preston Greene & Meghan Sullivan's "Against Time Bias," available open access here. Caspar Hare has kindly agreed to contribute a critical précis. Join us on July 15-17!
I'm pleased to announce the second discussion of a Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy (JESP) article here at PEA Soup. The article in question will be Matt King's (University of Alabama at Birmingham) "Manipulation Arguments and the Moral Standing to Blame". It is, of course, freely available from JESP's website (just follow the previous link in the article's title). This article investigates what types of considerations can undermine our standing to blame other people and it also argues that the general truth of determinism would not belong to these considerations. To start off the discussion, Patrick Todd (University of Edinburgh) has promised to write a short critical summary, which will be available here on PEA Soup on Monday the 24th of August, 2015. This response will be especially interesting because King's paper is largely a critical investigation of Todd's own 2012 Philosophers' Imprint paper "Manipulation and Moral Standing: an Argument for Incompatibilism". We are all very much looking forward to this discussion and we hope that you can take part in the discussion too!
In The Possibility of Altruism Thomas Nagel introduces a distinction between motivated and unmotivated desires that has since become standard in discussions of action theory and moral psychology. But what, exactly, are these categories? Many uses of the term, arguably including Nagel’s own, treat a desire as unmotivated if one has no reason for it. So conceived, unmotivated desires are mere urges, whims or unintelligible dispositions. It would be out of place to ask an agent to justify these states in the same way that it would be out of place to demand reasons for a headache. But Nagel introduces the idea differently, calling a desire unmotivated if one does not reason to it, that is does not engage in explicit practical reasoning resulting in the motivation to act.
Hi everyone. I've started a blog to workshop some ideas connected to my manuscript-in-progress, which I'm currently calling Normlessness and Nihilism. I'm at the very early stages of writing, and would very much welcome your comments and suggestions. My plan is to write 1-2 posts per week. The blog is HERE.
I am happy to announce that our next featured philosopher is the insightful and creative Kyla Ebels-Duggan (Northwestern). Her post, titled "More than Words Can Say: On Inarticulacy and Normative Commitment," will be up this Wednesday. Please stop by then to read the post and join the discussion!