PEA Soup

Well-being and Coherence

I'm attracted to a view of well-being with (roughly) the following structure: x is intrinsically good for y if and only if y believes that x is intrinsically good for y (under the right conditions, such as a coherent belief set).  In other words, there is nothing more to something's being good for x than for x to believe that it is good for her.  The closest cousin of this view is a desire-satisfaction view, which holds (again, very roughly, and leaving out all sorts of bells and whistles) that x is intrinsically good for y if and only if y desires x (under the right conditions, such as full-information, say).  I think the belief formulation can plausibly respond to several worries that plague desire accounts (such as the so-called "paradox of desire" and the problem of welfare-irrelevant desires, etc.).  But the view to which I'm attracted (call it, for lack of anything better, "belief-ism") faces an immediate and substantial hurdle: semantic circularity.  It looks as though the analysis of "intrinsically good" or "prudentially valuable", etc., is given in terms of the concept it purports to be analyzing.  Below the fold, I want to try out one possible response to this worry.

Personal Constraints?

A personal constraint is a constraint on action that arises from certain associative relations, such as kinship, friendship, etc. Typically, they are injunctions to treat one's personal relations with a certain form of priority over strangers even if, for instance, not doing so would promote more good overall. One could construe this as a constraint on rational action, viz., that any action that disobeyed such a constraint is all-things-considered irrational, or as a moral constraint, that any action that disobeyed such a constraint is all-things-considered immoral. (I'll leave this question open.) Personal constraints differ from personal options. I might have an option to treat my wife with a certain priority in the face of a greater good elsewhere, but I need not do so--in a conflict case I could also be justified in acting for the greater good. Personal constraints deny that one can be justified in refusing to act with priority to one's associates. Do such constraints exist? I want very briefly to run an argument up the flagpole that they do not.

Perfectionism, Hedonism, and Hume

Dale Miller's recent post on Mill's theory of value (and subsequent discussion) was quite enlightening. And it set me thinkin' about qualitative hedonism and perfectionism, and in particular the relationship between them. During our previous discussion, we appeared to be treating "Mill is a hedonist" and "Mill is a perfectionist" as mutually exclusive (or, at least, I was). I wonder if this isn't a mistake. And I wonder if it isn't possible to read one of Mill's sentimentalist forbears, viz., David Hume, as a person who holds both views. (Sorry, this post might be a little long. And sorry also if it reads like a collection of notes scribbled on a napkin; basically, it is.)

Hedonism and Categorization

It's fairly common to talk about welfare in three categories: hedonism, desire satisfaction, and objectivism (where this includes views like perfectionism and the objective list view). But this always seemed a little strange to me--there's loads of logical space missing here. So I prefer the following categorization: hedonism, subjectivism, and objectivism. Define "subjectivism" as the view that that a necessary condition of the welfare value of x is agential ratification. I leave "agential ratification" purposefully vague; I mean desires, evaluative beliefs, etc., whether actual, idealized, or dispositional. Define "objectivism" as the view that denies subjectivism: there can be xs that enhance welfare independent of desires, preferences, or agential ratification whether actual or idealized. But this is puzzling as well: the distinction between subjectivism and objectivism appears to capture the whole of logical space! So where does hedonism fall?