PEA Soup

Options, Actions, and Indeterminism

It is fairly common to give a conditional analysis of an option, e.g.:

(CAO) Performing an act X at a future time t1 is an option for a subject S at the present time t0 if and only if S would perform X at t1 if S were to intend (to try, to decide, or to choose) at t0 to perform X at t1.

I know that there are a host of problems with such conditional analyses, but let’s set those aside for the moment, for I want to address what seems to be an unappreciated worry concerning the possibility of indeterminism.

SLACRR 3 - Program

Here are the main speakers at the next St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality, May 20-22, 2012.

Keynote:  Jonathan Dancy (Texas/Reading), "More Right than Wrong"

Survey says: Doug’s wrong

Well, not quite. The survey showed that about one-third of the respondents shared my intuition that I (qua subject of the example) have no reason to purchase ITEM and that about two-thirds of respondents have the contrary intuition that I do have a reason to purchase ITEM. This doesn’t show that I’m wrong, but it does show that my intuition is not widely shared.

Now, here’s why this is important. In his excellent paper “Parfit’s Case against Subjectivism,” David Sobel argues that subjectivists – those who think that an agent’s reasons for action are all ultimately determined by the contingent pro and con attitudes that she would have under some procedurally specified conditions – can accept Parfit’s claim that we have current reasons to do what will prevent us from suffering future agony regardless of whether or not we have any current pro attitudes towards our avoiding future agony. Sobel argues that subjectivists will claim that anyone who will be in future agony will, in the future, necessarily have a future desire (when in agony) to get out of agony and so will, when in agony, have a reason to get out of agony. And he argues that, by appealing to this fact and what he calls the Reasons Transfer Principle, the subjectivist can hold not only that anyone who will be in future agony will have a future reason to get out of agony, but also that those who can avoid future agony have a present reason to avoid future agony. According to Sobel, the Reasons Transfer Principle (RTP) says: “If one will later have a reason to get O, then one now has a reason to facilitate the later getting of O.”

Reasons and Conjunctive Acts

Assume that my performing x would have beneficial effect, B1, providing me with an additional +19 utiles on Wednesday. Assume that my performing y would have detrimental effect, D1, providing me with an additional -10 utiles on Thursday. And assume that my performing z would have detrimental effect, D2, providing me with an additional -10 utiles on Friday. Lastly, assume that these are the only effects of these actions and that the timing of the effects is irrelevant.

Now, I think that many would say that the fact that my performing x would have beneficial effect B1 constitutes a reason for me to perform x. But, of course, my performing x&y&z (the conjunctive act) also has beneficial effect B1. So do I likewise have a reason to perform x&y&z? My intuition is that I have no reason at all to perform the conjunctive act x&y&z. Of course, those who want to claim that I do have some reason to perform x&y&z can cite the fact that the reason that I have to perform x&y&z is outweighed (although just barely) by the reasons that I have to refrain from performing x&y&z. But to my mind that’s not enough. Again, I’m inclined to deny that I have any reason at all to perform x&y&z.