PEA Soup

Philosophical Utilitarianism

In “Contractualism and Utilitarianism” Scanlon introduces what he calls “philosophical utilitarianism” (PU). PU is the view that “the only fundamental moral facts are facts about individual well-being.” PU is supposed to be answering a different question from the one answered by more familiar versions of utilitarianism. It is a view in what Scanlon calls “philosophical ethics,” which means that it is supposed to explain “why anyone should care” about morality at all; to “make clearer to us the nature of the reasons that morality does provide.” It’s supposed to do some other things too.

I don’t understand PU, nor do I understand how it could be thought to do any of the things Scanlon wants a philosophical theory of morality to do.

Philosopher Bloggers of the Past

Winter is a good time for a bit of navel-gazing.  Blogging is an interesting medium of philosophical discourse; its virtues and vices, it seems to me at any rate, are considerably different from those of the more standard, tenure-relevant sorts of philosophical work.  Posts and comments have to be relatively short, making their points quickly and clearly, even vividly.  The medium doesn’t sustain narrow specialists very well.  It doesn’t allow the intense, in-depth kinds of argument that so many articles and book chapters engage in.  However, it also prevents the exploration of grand sweeping metaphysical worldviews.  All of which prompts the question, which great philosophers of the past would have made good bloggers?

A Wiki on Philosophy Journals

Inspired by the Philosophy Job Market Wiki, I decided to start a wiki that will allow authors, editors, and referees to share information on philosophy journals: their editorial practices, response times, backlogs on publishing, policies on providing comments to authors, etc. There is, I think, a great need for such information, as in many cases the information provided by the journals themselves on their own web sites is often outdated or incomplete. A wiki, by the way, is a web site that allows visitors to easily add, remove, and otherwise edit its content. So I invite you to share whatever knowledge you have of the editorial policies and practices of philosophy journals by adding what you know to the Philosophy Journals Information wiki at http://wikihost.org/wikis/philjinfo/. If you have information to add, please go this site, read the instructions, click on the appropriate partial edit icons (they look like tiny pages at the end of every heading), and then add what you know. And please spread the word about the wiki. Thanks, Doug.

Acting in order to know what's good

Having just taught Aristotle's ethics, I want to discuss an element of his ethical theory that I find plausible but lack a satisfactory account of why it's plausible: In contrast to the Socratic/Platonic tradition, which held that one must know the good in order to act well, Aristotle held that one must first act well — and come to so act as a matter of habit or second nature — in order to know the good.  The interesting insight here (which seems obvious but is easy enough to overlook) is that one can only come to appreciate the reasons for acting in a particular way by first acting in that way.  Engaging in a practice, Aristotle thought, is necessary in order to understand the point of the practice.

Robert Solomon (1942-2007)

As Brian Leiter reports, Robert Solomon passed away suddenly on January 2nd.  Solomon's philosophical interests were jaw-droppingly broad, even within ethics alone--virtue ethics (Aristotle's and Nietzsche's versions), business ethics, emotions, existentialism, happiness.  But his interests were all motivated, from what I could tell, by a desire to understand a life well-lived.  Hence, his more than forty books and one hundred fifty articles include The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning of Life (Doubleday, 1976), Ethics and  Excellence (Oxford, 1992), Spirituality for the Skeptic: The Thoughtful Love of Life (Oxford, 2002), The Philosophy of (Erotic) Love (with Kathleen Higgens, University Press of Kansas, 1991), and The Joy of Philosophy (Oxford, 1999).  I still use Robert's Introducing Philosophy: A Text with Integrated Readings (8th Ed., Oxford, 2005) in my intro courses, since his text is, in parts, inspirational even to me.  Keep an eye on Leiter Reports for a link to a memorial.  Leiter also links to an episode of "Philosophy Talk", in which Solomon discusses happiness.

Expressivism and Named Moral Theories

Al, Betty, Carla, Dan, and Ed accept the claim, “Utilitarianism is true.”  They accept it because they have been told it by their revered professor, Dr. Black.  In fact, their reverence for Dr. Black is so great that they would revise any other claim they accept before revising this one.  However, there is a twist.  In addition to accepting that utilitarianism is true, each student also has certain other beliefs as well:

• Al believes, correctly, that utilitarianism is the moral theory that tells you to do what will bring about the greatest happiness for the greatest number.
• Betty believes, correctly, that utilitarianism is a moral theory, but she does not know which theory it is.
• Carla has no idea what utilitarianism is.
• Dan believes, incorrectly, that ‘utilitarianism’ is the name of a mathematical thesis, though he has no opinions about which mathematical thesis it names.
• Ed believes, incorrectly, that utilitarianism is the claim that the square of the hypotenuse of a right triangle is equal in area to the sum of the squares of the other two sides (i.e., he has utilitarianism confused with the Pythagorean theorem).

We would ordinarily say that all the students have at least one belief (or more generally, one mental state) in common, namely the belief that utilitarianism is true.  And we would say that when each asserts, “Utilitarianism is true” they all mean the same thing.  But can an expressivist make sense of these ordinary intuitions?

Welcome Valerie Tiberius

We are pleased to announce that Valerie Tiberius has accepted our invitation to become the latest contributor to PEA Soup.  Valerie is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Minnesota.  She specializes in Ethical Theory and Metaethics, especially issues involving well-being and practical reason.  It's great to have you aboard, Valerie.  Welcome!

Parfit’s State-Given Reasons

The great discussion on the previous posting got so much off the topic that I thought I’d start another threat just on the interesting issue we were discussing. This is Parfit’s account of state and object given reasons. I’m sure we’ve touched in this in our virtual-reading group too but I’ve forgotten what we concluded then.