PEA Soup

The Self-Torturer and Instrumental Rationality

Warren Quinn’s puzzle of the self-torturer is supposed to show that cyclic preferences can be rational, and that, in cases where they are, rationality can require resoluteness so that the agent does not end up with an alternative that is worse than the one with which s/he started. 

As Quinn makes explicit, his concern is with instrumental rationality.  It is thus natural to interpret Quinn’s use of “worse” as “worse, relative to the agent’s preferences.”  But how is “X is worse than Y, relative to the agent’s preferences” to be understood when X and Y are part of a preference cycle?

Ethics Discussions at PEA Soup: Jaworska & Tannenbaum's "Person-Rearing Relationships as a Key to Higher Moral Status," with critical précis by Margaret Little and Jake Earl

Welcome to our newest Ethics discussion, on Agnieszka Jaworska & Julie Tannenbaum's "Person-Rearing Relationships as a Key to Higher Moral Status"! The paper has been made open access here.

Margaret Little and Jake Earl kick off the discussion with a critical commentary below the fold.

 

From Ought to Is

Dear Soupers,

Do you enjoy puzzles? Yeah? Well then, let me share one with you.  John Basl (Northeastern University) and I have had some fruitful conversations about it; and we have some views about how to address it (and some views about how not to); but in the spirit of collective inquiry and intellectual theft let me take this opportunity to solicit your initial responses.

The puzzle might be construed either in terms of rationality or theoretical justification, but it is roughly as follows:

 Why are we permitted to revise our moral/normative/evaluative beliefs in light of non-moral beliefs but not vice versa?

Indeed, while it’s clear we are often guilty of sub-consciously shaping the facts to fit our evaluative commitments (e.g. the powerful correlations between political ideology “climate skepticism”, 911 conspiracy theories, and beliefs about the president’s religion and birthplace), we all disavow this a proper way to form our non-moral beliefs.As obvious as this may seem, the puzzle is how to best explain why this is so and then sorting out what the implications may be for meta-ethics, moral epistemology, and even epistemology more generally.... 

Reminder: Ethics discussions at PEA soup - Jaworska & Tannenbaum on moral status

This is just a reminder that our next Ethics discussion, on Agnieszka Jaworska & Julie Tannenbaum's "Person-Rearing Relationships as a Key to Higher Moral Status," kicks off on Thu, Feb 20.

The paper has been made open access here. Margaret Little and Jake Earl are contributing a critical commentary.

I hope many of you can join the discussion!

Featured Philosophers: D'Arms and Jacobson

Once again, it's my great pleasure to welcome you to another edition of the Featured Philosophers.  I hope you all will welcome Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson!

-dd

A worry regarding the necessity of defensive force

I've got, well, a worry regarding the "necessity" requirement on the legitimacy of self- or other-defensive force. I don't really work on this stuff, so it's entirely possible that there's an easy, pat answer to this worry. Anyway, I'd be interested to hear what you all think.

Coming Attractions: D'Arms and Jacobson!

Hi all,

This is just a friendly reminder that this Friday we'll have another post in our Featured Philosophers series, this time from Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson.  Mark your calendars!

-dd

Favorite objections to subjectivism

I’m interested to know what people think are the most compelling objections to subjectivism. I understand subjectivism to be the view that one has a reason to do something iff and because doing that thing would further something that one has a favoring, not truth assessable, attitude toward. I take it that the subjectivist can say that the relevant favoring attitude is idealized in various ways, such as being accurately informed about the object of the attitude. Further I assume the subjectivist can pick and choose between favoring attitudes, for example, granting authority to attitudes closer to valuing the object and further from craving the object. Hopefully that gives enough of a sense of the view I mean to be talking about. Bernard Williams, for example, was, I think, a subjectivist even if his official formulation of (existence) internalism did not fully commit him to that view. Anyway, if I have managed to put a view on the table, tell me what you think is the best objection to it. 

C & D Month (First Names!) on the Soup

It's February, which means if your first name starts with a C or D, it's your "special month" to post on the Soup.  See Intructions for Contributors.  This means you, Sobel.  Oh wait, it also means me (and Chike, and Chris, and Chrisoula, and Christian...).