PEA Soup

On Rage As a Moral Emotion

It is not rare to see groups of enraged people engaged in destructive behavior when you turn on the news these days. Such behavior is puzzling when we think of the agents as rational choosers, since it is often obviously counterproductive. The agents end up in many respects worse off – the neighborhoods that get damaged in riots tend to be the ones rioters live or work in, above all, and violent resistance often invites a brutal response from those who hold the power and control the drones. So what’s the deal with rage? Does it make sense to act out of rage? Can rage be warranted? In this tentative exploration of the issue (I haven’t come across any philosophical literature on it), I’ll argue that it can be, and that when it is, much of the moral responsibility for the wrongful harm that results from acting out of rage belongs to those who have created the rage-warranting situation.

Helpful List of Recurring Philosophy Conferences

UPDATED:

Elizabeth Harman and Daniel Wodak have created this helpful list of recurring philosophy conferences complete with useful information about each conference. One can edit the document so as to add to the list.

When adding a conference to the list, add a row to the table so as to keep the current organization by deadlines intact. Also, keep the information as concise as possible.

Expressivism, Subjectivism and Reasons

This post will be difficult to write as I’ll have to reign in my frustrations (I was thinking of calling this ‘Must Do Better’ or ‘All Souls Night, Part II’…). I’ve been reading Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek’s and Peter Singer’s The Point of View of the Universe – Sidgwick & Contemporary Ethics. Chapter 2 (sections 2–4) of this book contains a ‘Parfit-inspired’ criticism of expressivism and Blackburn, which I find quite upsetting. It makes me feel sad for Simon Blackburn (he really must get tired of objections like this) and it also makes me wonder about OUP’s editorial processes (I don’t see how this section could pass a peer-reviewed journal). In any case, here I want to start from a very basic distinction and then go through quickly some of the fairly outrageous claims de Lazari-Radek and Singer make about expressivism.

Ignorance and Moral Blameworthiness (by Featured Philosopher Julia Markovits)

Thanks so much for inviting me to contribute today!  Recently, I’ve been thinking about the relationship between different kinds of ignorance and moral blameworthiness.   I’m interested in how we should respond to wrong action that is (partly) attributable to moral ignorance, where that ignorance has a cultural dimension. 

If the criteria for the rightness and wrongness of actions is not, fundamentally, culture-relative (and I think it is not), can we make room for the possibility that the appropriateness of praising or blaming a certain right or wrong action is culture-relative?  For example, in virtue of what is 18^th century abolitionism more admirable than opposition to slavery today?  In what sense (if any) is 18^th century slaveholding less blameworthy that slaveholding is/would be today? 

Featured Philosopher: Julia Markovits

I am glad to announce that, after a summer hiatus, PEA Soup is starting up the Featured Philosophers series again.  Tomorrow, I will be adding a post by Julia Markovits, who just moved from MIT to Cornell.  Julia is well known for her influential and thought-provoking articles, and her book Moral Reason is just out from Oxford.  It defends an attractive, internalist acount of Kantian morality and is sure to spark fruitful discussion and debate.  She will be posting on one of her current projects, and I hope you can stop by and join the discussion!

Templeton Funding, Fall Cycle

As part of its fall open submission cycle, the John Templeton Foundation welcomes online funding inquiries in the areas of philosophy and theology.  The submission window is August 1 to October 1, 2014.  Proposed philosophical projects need not have religion or theology as a focus.  To submit an online funding inquiry, please visit here.

Please note that the Templeton Foundation does not normally provide dissertation fellowships through this open submission process.  For more information on the kinds of projects that the Foundation can support, visit here. A list of Foundation grants in the areas of philosophy and theology can be found here.

Bleg: Jounals that welcome commentary/discussion pieces?

Hi everyone, and a special wave to our new member Mark Timmons!

When graduate students ask me about publishing, I often suggest they start by submitting a tight discussion/commentary piece.  The trouble, however, is that I don't know which journals welcome them.  Ethics, of course.  And APQ and AJP, I think. But which others?  So, with your much appreciated help, maybe we can generate a couple useful lists.  And so:

1. Which journals welcome discussions/commentaries on works they've published?  

2. Which jounals also welcome discussions/commentaries on works published elsewhere?

Welcome to Mark Timmons!

I'm happy to extend a warm Soup welcome to Mark Timmons as he becomes an official contributor to PEA Soup.  Mark is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona, and he's published all sorts of excellent articles and books on a variety of topics in moral philosophy, especially in metaethics and Kantian ethics.  He's also co-authored a number of memorable papers and this outstanding introductory reader, and he organizes and hosts the annual WiNE (Workshop in Normative Ethics) in Tucson, which many of us regularly attend.  Welcome aboard, Mark!

Conference Announcement: Illuminating Reasons

A conference, Illuminating Reasons: An Inquiry into the Phenomenology of Moral Experience, will take place October 16-18, 2014 in Tucson, Arizona, featuring prominent scholars from the fields of philosophy and psychology.  The conference is part of a project being conducted by Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons of the University of Arizona, funded by a grant from the John Templeton Foundation.  
 
The conference will be streamed live, allowing remote viewers to submit questions to speakers.
 

Ethics discussions at PEA Soup: Peter Railton's "The Affective Dog and Its Rational Tale: Intuition and Attunement," with a critical précis by Bryce Huebner

Join us to discuss Peter Railton's new Ethics article, "The Affective Dog and Its Rational Tale: Intuition and Attunement"! The article is available open access here. Bryce Huebner kicks off the discussion with a critical précis below the fold: