PEA Soup

New Methods of Ethics 1 Programme

HERE is the programme of the first New Methods of Ethics Conference, which will be held here at the University of Birmingham in September (15th and 16th). The conference is free and open to all, but please book a place by emailing me ([email protected]) as there are limited places available.  If you have any questions about attending the conference, feel free to email me at any point. The programme for the second conference in January will follow shortly.

The Morality of Library Fines

My local library fines its patrons ten cents per overdue book per day. They will let you continue to borrow books as long as your fine balance is less than $10. As an academic, I sort of think of library fines as a cost of doing business, and I frequently carry a balance in library fines of a few dollars. (To be clear: I mostly incur these fines on books taken out for pleasure reading. What I mean is that I don’t have a moralistic attitude about my library fines.) Since there are no interest charges or time limits, I can carry such a balance for months on end. I’m following the rules, not cheating anyone, and I have never felt bad about my habit of being a few bucks in debt to the library.

WiNE Program Out!

From Mark Timmons:

The 2017 Program for the 8^th annual Arizona Workshop in Normative Ethics is now available here. Registration is free and open to all. You may register to attend here. I will send periodic updates to those who register.

Information about the Westward Look resort (where the workshop will be held) and about travel and accommodations is available on the workshop website. I hope you will join us this January.

Ethics Discussion at PEA Soup: Joshua Gert's "A Fitting End to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem," with a critical précis by Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson

Welcome to what we expect will be a very interesting discussion of Joshua Gert's "A Fitting End to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem." The paper is published in the most recent edition of Ethics and is available through open access here. Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson have kindly agreed to contribute a critical précis, and it appears immediately below. Please join in the discussion!

Objective and subjective akrasia

Suppose that there is both an objective ‘ought’ and a subjective ‘ought’. Which of these two kinds of ‘ought’ figures in the anti-akrasia principle that it is irrational to do something at the same time as believing that one ought not to do it?

There is a simple of way of understanding the relation between the objective and the subjective ‘ought’ on which the answer to this question is: Both! It is irrational to do something at the same time as believing that one objectively ought not to do it; and it is also irrational to do something at the same time as believing that one subjectively ought not to do it.

(Note: The original version of this post contained a terrible mistake, which was pointed out by Doug Portmore and Jamie Dreier in their comments below. This is an amended version, without the mistake.)

Final Call for Abstracts: 2016 Effective Altruism Global Research Meeting

Location: August 5th to 7th, University of California, Berkeley

Abstract Deadline: July 10th

Contact: [email protected]

Overview
The 2016 Effective Altruism Global Research Meeting is an opportunity for Postgraduate students and early stage academics from a variety of disciplines to present research relevant to Effective Altruism. The meeting will take place on August 5th to 7th, 2016 at UC Berkeley alongside the Effective Altruism Global conference. The meeting will consist of two events, an academic poster session and a number of short oral presentations. Presentations will be awarded to the most exceptional submissions. Participants selected for presentations will still have the option to present a poster.

Upcoming Ethics Discussion, July 14-16: Joshua Gert's "A Fitting End to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem," with a critical précis by Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson

We're excited to announce our next Ethics discussion, which will be about Joshua Gert's "A Fitting End to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem." The paper is available through open access here. Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson have kindly agreed to contribute a critical précis.  Join us July 14-16!