PEA Soup

Open Letter Regarding Compensation for Bone Marrow Cell Donation

I hope the Soupers won't mind a bit of public philosophy! http://donationethics.com

Arguably, the jury is still out regarding the ethics of compensation for organ donation (and even more so for allowing organ purchase). Legally speaking, in the United States such compensation is outlawed under 1984's National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA). New technology has recently altered the relevant legal landscape. It is now possible to collect bone marrow stem cells for transplantation, not through the traditional, invasive procedure of inserting a needle into the donor's marrow itself, but by giving the donor a drug that stimulates and releases stem cells into the surrounding blood, where it can be collected through something akin to a traditional blood donation procedure ("aphoresis") . In Flynn v. Holder, it was ruled that given this procedure's similarity to blood and plasma donation, for which compensation is legal, NOTA does not apply. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is proposing an amendment to NOTA that would effectively prohibit compensation for donation through aphoresis. My friend and colleague, Peter Jaworski, has written an open letter (with input from myself and others) to HHS opposing this amendment. He, myself, and the others who signed the letter agree that there is no legitimate ethical basis for the amendment. Importantly, I think even many of those who are wary of compensation for organ donation generally should share this view. Most if not all of the ethical concerns that attach to (e.g.) kidney markets simply do not apply here. 

Peter is inviting other ethicists to sign the letter. If you're interested, please check out the website (which I'm managing). If you'd like to add your name, you can contact Peter or myself. And, of course, comments are welcome, here or via email.

Sex Work is Different

This post was inspired by a story in the WaPo, the relevant detail of which is that, due to the economic hardship in Greece, some young Greek women are selling sex for the price of a sandwich they cannot otherwise afford to buy. Also, the argument I want to make may be old news; this is not a topic where I have a lot of familiarity with the literature.

There are basically two moral views about sex work, which I will define for present purposes as the exchange of money for some form of sex in short-term, one-off transactions. (So, here, sex work is prostitution.) One view is that sex work is a lot like other kinds of work, except it is mostly performed by women and, due to various kinds of sexism and discrimination, has historically been stigmatized and exploited labor. The right course is to learn to treat sex work as normal work, and enact appropriate regulation that protects the sex workers, in the same spirit one would legally protect other kinds of workers.

The other moral view, which I take to be encoded in most state laws in the US (I can’t speak for elsewhere), is that sex work is morally problematic in some deeper way. The usual thought, I believe, is that it degrades the sex worker; sex work is intrinsically undignified. The proper way to handle sex work is to proscribe it entirely, where this is practical, and in any case discourage it.   What follows is an argument in favor of this general view.

Religious Exemptions Conference at BGSU, April 17th-18th

Hi folks. I thought I'd post a reminder for anyone interested that Bowling Green State University is hosting a conference, "The Scope of Religious Exemptions," on April 17th and 18th. Our keynote speakers are Robert Audi (Notre Dame) and Andy Koppelman (Northwestern). Michael Perry (Emory) and Perry Dane (Rutgers) are presenting their work as well, along with Jocelyn Macclure, Lucas Swaine, Chad Flanders, Lori Watson, Christie Hartley, Simon May, Kyle Swan, Mark Navin, Naama Ofrath. Here's a link to our conference webpage. If you're available, you can register for the conference there. We'd love to have you!

What's wrong with Torture

It's been a couple of days since the Senate released the torture report. The discussion in the press seems to concern (a) whether it really might be effective, (b) whether that doesn't miss the point, that it's wrong and that we should take the stance "we don't do that"; (c) whether the partisan bickering about the report--is it accurate? will it hurt us internationally?--will undermine any broader significance it might have; and (d) how other countries might respond to it--with violence, prosecution, admiration, etc.

A few days back I posted on my Facebook page a link to a piece in The New Republic entitled "We Will Never Know Whether Torture Works. That Shouldn't Matter." A friend then asked me if it was really true that its effectiveness doesn't matter. As he put it: "[T]he use of a flamethrower on [a] bunker is to protect the lives of one's own soldiers [and citizens], while in the classic "ticking bomb" scenario the use of torture is to protect civilian lives. So maybe there's more symmetry between the two cases than I've usually thought. But the difference remains that flamethrowers are effective in clearing bunkers, while torture is of questionable effectiveness at best. Would we consider flamethrowers acceptable were they ineffective, though still horrifying brutal, weapons? I think not. And would we consider torture permissible were it foolproof? Perhaps. So I'm not sure I agree with the article's conclusion that the question of effectiveness is irrelevant."

Philosophy in an Inclusive Key Summer Institute (PIKSI) needs our help

If, like me, you've been frustrated with all that's going on in Philosophy (or not going on as the case may be) and want to do something positive to help our profession, here's an opportunity. Philosophy in an Inclusive Key Summer Institute (PIKSI) is a weeklong summer school that brings undergraduates from underrepresented groups into graduate school for philosophy. It has been operating for nine years, in part with funding from the American Philosophical Association. That funding is no longer assured, and so PIKSI needs our help. Its organizers are running a crowd-funding campaign here. They are more than halfway to their modest goal. As noted over at Daily Nous, If everyone who reads this contributes just five dollars they would meet that goal in a day, easy. Go to the site, read about it (some interesting facts there), watch the video, and make a contribution. (Thanks to Serene Khader, the institute’s incoming director for bringing this to my attention.)

CFP: The Scope of Religious Exemptions

CALL FOR ABSTRACTS

The Bowling Green Workshop in Applied Ethics and Public Policy

The Scope of Religious Exemptions

April 17^th-18^th, 2015 

The Bowling Green Workshop in Applied Ethics and Public Policy will take place in Bowling Green, Ohio, April 17^th-18^th, 2015. The keynote speakers are Robert Audi (University of Notre Dame) and Andrew Koppelman (Northwestern University). 

Those interested in presenting a paper are invited to submit a 2-3 page abstract (double-spaced) by November 15^th, 2014. We welcome submissions in all areas in applied ethics and philosophical issues relevant to this year’s conference theme: the scope of religious exemptions. We are especially focused on papers that address normative questions about religious exemptions, including the moral-philosophical justifications for religious exemptions and how often and to whom religious exemptions should be granted. We will consider multiple approaches to the topic, not merely in political philosophy and political theory, but normative ethics, metaethics and applied ethics. 

Only one submission per person is permitted. Abstracts will be evaluated by a program committee and decisions made in December 2014. Please direct all abstracts and queries to: [email protected] 

Further information about the Workshop and previous workshops are available on the workshop website (under construction): http://www.bgsu.edu/arts-and-sciences/philosophy/workshops-and-conferences.html

On Rage As a Moral Emotion

It is not rare to see groups of enraged people engaged in destructive behavior when you turn on the news these days. Such behavior is puzzling when we think of the agents as rational choosers, since it is often obviously counterproductive. The agents end up in many respects worse off – the neighborhoods that get damaged in riots tend to be the ones rioters live or work in, above all, and violent resistance often invites a brutal response from those who hold the power and control the drones. So what’s the deal with rage? Does it make sense to act out of rage? Can rage be warranted? In this tentative exploration of the issue (I haven’t come across any philosophical literature on it), I’ll argue that it can be, and that when it is, much of the moral responsibility for the wrongful harm that results from acting out of rage belongs to those who have created the rage-warranting situation.

Philosophers at the Leveson Inquiry

All of you are of course aware that here in the UK there has been huge phone hacking scandal. This scandal lead to the Leveson Inquiry on Culture, Practice, and Ethics of Press. Last week, on Monday 16th of July, the Inquiry interviewed various philosophers on freedom of speech, human rights, democracy, and media ethics. These incredibly interesting interviews can be viewed online. The morning session is on this page:

http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/hearing/2012-07-16am/

The philosophers interviewed in this session are first Jennifer Hornsby (Birkbeck), Sue Mendus (York), and John Tasioulas (UCL). The second half of the session interviews Rowan Cruft (Stirling) and Chris Megone (Leeds). The afternoon session is here:

http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/hearing/2012-07-16pm/

It contains the interviews of Neil Manson (Lancaster) and Onora O'Neill (Cambridge). The page also has a link to an interesting witness statement from Jeremy Waldron (NYU).

Call on the New York Times to publish an obituary for Ruth Marcus

Michael Della Rocca has given me permission to post this request, which he sent to a number of Marcus-admirers and friends, to PEA Soup.

 

Dear Friends and admirers of Ruth Marcus,

Forgive the mass e-mailing, any duplications, or omissions.  As you
know, Ruth Marcus died over two weeks ago and an obituary has yet to
appear in the New York Times.  This failure to recognize one of the most
prominent and pioneering philosophers of the last 60 years is
appalling.  There have been multiple communications between Yale and
also NYU (Ruth's undergraduate alma mater) with the obituary editors at
the Times.  The Times has received a wealth of information from these
sources and still no obituary.  I fear that they have decided or are in
the process of deciding that Ruth is not a significant enough figure to
warrant the recognition of an obituary in the Times.  Don't get me
started on this -- it's simply outrageous.  Don Garrett, Diana Raffman
and I  have sent to the Times' obituary editors a strongly worded
message -- see below.  If you would like to endorse the sentiments in
this message please let me know and we will pass on this information to
the Times.  I plan to be in touch with them again soon.  Or if you would
like to write a message of your own to the Times that would be great.
The obituary editors are Bill McDonald<[email protected]>   and Jack
Kadden<[email protected]>.

If there are other philosophers you know of who might be interested in
helping out here, please feel free to forward this message and to
encourage them to be in touch with me or Diana or Don.

Don, Diana, and I will be in touch directly with the APA leadership
about this matter so that they may contact the Times too.

best,
Michael (and Diana and Don)

Below the fold is the message that was sent yesterday to the Obituary editors at the Times:

Goodin and the Big Society

As anyone who reads Leiter Reports or follows the Philos-L mailing-list knows, there has been a big uproar recently in the UK about the AHRC’s (a government body which funds Arts and Humanities research) ‘connected communities’ funding scheme. One problem is that, in advertising the scheme, the AHRC has adopted the current government’s notion of the ‘Big Society’. This raises a variety of important ethical questions about on what grounds public research funding should be distributed. However, in this post, I want to focus on the question of whether the Big Society is a good idea in the first place. It seems to me that, contrary to what some people at the AHRC and the government seem to think, there’s already plenty of good philosophical research done to show that it is not (which has unfortunately been ignored in the public discourse). So, to do my part of the unoriginal academic research on the Big Society, I want to lay out Robert Goodin’s argument against the Big Society from his wonderful 1988 book Reasons for Welfare – the Political Theory of the Welfare State.