PEA Soup

CFP: Neutrality: Reasons, Values, and Times

From Andrew Forcehimes:

Date: July 12-14, 2017.

Location: Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

Confirmed Keynote Speakers: 

• David Brink (University of California, San Diego)
• Julia Driver (Washington University at St. Louis)
• Douglas Portmore (Arizona State University)
• Michael Smith (Princeton)

Non-Natural Normative Properties and the Principle of Parsimony

Disclaimer: This is way outside of my wheelhouse. So the chances that this is just misguided are great. But it’s my month to post and I’m answering the editor’s (Half-Assed) Plea for Half-Assedness.

Many moral skeptics appeal to the following metaphysical thesis in supporting their view:

• Metaphysical Naturalism (NAT) – There are only natural properties.

And ethical non-naturalists are committed to the following metaphysical thesis:

• Metaphysical Plurality Thesis (PLU) – In addition to natural properties, there are non-natural properties.

Now, many think that NAT is more plausible than PLU on the grounds of parsimony. I think that this is a mistake.

A Bleg: Normative Requirements regarding Intention

Many philosophers (such as J. H. Sobel, R. J. Wallace, G. Harman, M. Bratman, and J. D. Velleman) endorse something along the lines of the following normative requirement regarding intention:

R1: It is impermissible/irrational for S both to intend to X and to believe that she will not X (even if she intends to X).

And I think that most (all?) philosophers endorse something along the lines of this requirement of instrumental rationality:

R2: It is impermissible/irrational for S to intend to Y, believe that X-ing is a necessary means to Y-ing, but not intend to X.

But are there any philosophers who endorse the following requirement?

A Possibly New Take on Newcomb’s Problem

Consider Newcomb’s Problem: “A psychology professor at your school has a reputation for being brilliant as well as possessed of an enormous fortune she has dedicated to her research. One day you get a request to report to her office at a certain hour. On a table are two boxes. One of them, labeled A, is transparent; in it you can see an enormous pile of $100 bills. The other, labeled B, is opaque. She tells you that there is $10,000 in transparent box A and that in box B there is either $1,000,000 or nothing. She tells you that she is going to give you a choice between:"

New PhD in Applied and Practical Philosophy

Arizona State University's newly redesigned PhD in Philosophy features a focus on Practical and Applied Philosophy. Practical Philosophy includes the fields of ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of law, social and political philosophy, and feminist ethics and political philosophy. Applied Philosophy includes both the application of theories developed within any of the sub-disciplines of philosophy to everyday problems or phenomena, as well as the application of research and tools used in other disciplines to understanding and addressing philosophical questions (e.g., experimental philosophy).

Why Regan’s Work Is Groundbreaking: There’s No Fundamental Moral Obligation to Perform Acts

In an earlier post, I claimed that Regan’s Utilitarianism and Co-operation is important because it shows that in order for a moral theory to be plausible it must require of agents something beyond just the performance of certain actions—in other words, it must not be exclusively act-orientated. But, as Matt suggested in his comment, the idea that moral theories should require of agents something beyond just the performance of certain actions isn’t exactly groundbreaking. After all, lots of moral theorists have claimed (and well before 1980) that agents are required not only to perform certain actions but also to possess certain virtues, have certain motives, internalize certain rules, apply certain decision procedures, etc.

Gustafsson’s Criticism of Maximalism

[This post is related to my previous one, but this won’t be apparent until the very end.]

Some options are more specific than others. One option is more specific than another if and only if the performance of the one option logically necessitates the performance of the other but not vice versa. Thus, sitting down at my desk is more specific than sitting down. And sitting down at my desk and then checking my email is more specific than sitting down at my desk. An option is maximally specific (hereafter ‘maximal’) if and only if there is no other option that is more specific than it.

Moral Theories Should Not Be Exclusively Act-Orientated

One of the great works of recent moral philosophy is Don Regan’s Utilitarianism and Co-operation (New York: OUP, 1980). Although the theory that Regan argues for in the book (viz., cooperative utilitarianism) is, I believe, untenable, I think that Regan makes a very important discovery: that no exclusively act-orientated moral theory will be tenable. Now, unfortunately, Regan gives us nothing much beyond the following rough characterization of what it means for a theory to be exclusively act-orientated: “a theory is exclusively act-orientated if it can be stated in the form ‘An agent should that act which…’.” (p. 10). But perhaps we can do better and define the notion as follows: A theory T is not exclusively act-orientated if and only if T requires of agents something more than just the performance of certain voluntary acts. With this definition in hand, let me explain how any moral theory that is exclusively act-orientated will have counterintuitive implications in the following case, which I borrow with revision from Regan (p. 18) and which I name The Buttons. I name it this, because it involves two individuals, Coop and Uncoop, each with a button in front of them. Depending on whether or not each pushes their respective buttons, the consequences will be as depicted in Table 1.

Post Survey Roundup

So the results are in. 63% of the respondents said that they would have most reason to refrain from making such significant sacrifices. 62% said that they would not be morally required to make such significant sacrifices. And 77% denied that the fact that the climate disaster would have been averted had, contrary to fact, everyone (or even just nearly everyone) been willing to make the significant sacrifices required to drastically reduce their carbon footprints constitutes a reason for them to make these sacrifices that is strong enough to outweigh the reasons that they have to avoid doing that which would be significantly detrimental to how they and their families fare.

One More Related Survey

This concerns the same prompt: Here it is: http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/MF5WX2Y