PEA Soup

New Methods of Ethics 1 Programme

HERE is the programme of the first New Methods of Ethics Conference, which will be held here at the University of Birmingham in September (15th and 16th). The conference is free and open to all, but please book a place by emailing me ([email protected]) as there are limited places available.  If you have any questions about attending the conference, feel free to email me at any point. The programme for the second conference in January will follow shortly.

Objective and subjective akrasia

Suppose that there is both an objective ‘ought’ and a subjective ‘ought’. Which of these two kinds of ‘ought’ figures in the anti-akrasia principle that it is irrational to do something at the same time as believing that one ought not to do it?

There is a simple of way of understanding the relation between the objective and the subjective ‘ought’ on which the answer to this question is: Both! It is irrational to do something at the same time as believing that one objectively ought not to do it; and it is also irrational to do something at the same time as believing that one subjectively ought not to do it.

(Note: The original version of this post contained a terrible mistake, which was pointed out by Doug Portmore and Jamie Dreier in their comments below. This is an amended version, without the mistake.)

Conference: Practical Reason and Metaethics April 21-23

John Brunero and I are running a conference on Practical Reason and Metaethics, here in Lincoln, Nebraska on April 21st to 23rd. Speakers include Michael Bratman (Stanford), Stephen Darwall (Yale), Jonathan Drake (Texas), Amelia Hicks (Kansas State), Chris Howard (Arizona), Sarah McGrath (Princeton), Barry Maguire (UNC), and Sigrún Svavarsdóttir (Tufts). There were over 75 submissions for the refereed program and we expect it to be a very good conference.

There will be a free conference dinner Friday night and a party Saturday, so please register if you are coming by sending an email to [email protected] stating that you plan on attending. There's no fee to attend. 

The conference website is https://sites.google.com/site/practicalreasonandmetaethics/. Further information and the schedule is below the fold.

CHill Meta 2 Call for Abstracts

I am pleased to announce a Call for Abstracts for the 2^nd annual CHillMeta workshop, taking place in Chapel Hill on September 9-11, 2016. Abstracts (of 3 double-spaced pages) of papers in any area of metaethics are welcome from almost anyone—only those who were speakers in the 2014 or 2015 workshop are ineligible to submit something for this year’s event. Submissions are limited to one per person and are due by May 1, 2016. Please email submissions and send any questions to me. A program committee will evaluate submissions and make decisions by early June. More information about the workshop is available here.

On a related note: if you are interested in submitting a paper for the Marc Sanders Prize in Metaethics (announced earlier here), these are due to me, via email, by March 1. Anyone within 15 years of having received a Ph.D. is eligible to submit a paper for consideration. The winner receives $10,000, an automatic spot on the CHillMeta program, and inclusion of his or her paper in a future volume of Oxford Studies in Metaethics.

Hope to see you in Chapel Hill this fall!
All the best,
Russ Shafer-Landau

Conference/CFP: Practical Reason and Metaethics

The Department of Philosophy at the University of Nebraska – Lincoln is hosting a conference on Practical Reason and Metaethics to be held April 22-23, 2016.  The invited speakers on the conference program are:

• Michael Bratman  (Stanford)

• Stephen Darwall  (Yale)

• Sarah McGrath  (Princeton)

• Sigrún Svavarsdóttir  (Tufts)

Call for Papers: Four additional papers will be selected though an anonymous review of submissions.  For each paper selected, the conference will contribute up to $800 to cover the travel and accommodations of the authors. Submissions are due December 1, 2015. More info below the fold.

Rationality is permissibility

Many philosophers seem to think that – even if the notions of a belief’s being “justified” or “rational” are indeed normative notions, as is widely held to be the case – to say that a belief is “justified” is “rational” is to say something stronger than merely that the belief is permissible.

This is a mistake. It is easy to prove that if the notions of a belief’s being “justified” or “rational” are normative at all, then the permissibility of a belief is sufficient for the belief’s being justified or rational.

CHill 2015 Program

The First Annual Chapel Hill Metaethics Workshop (announced here in April) now has a complete lineup, including a new Sanders Prize winner. Program below the fold; and more info at the workshop's web site. To register (for free!) just send email to Russ S-L.

 

New Blog: Normlessness and Nihilism

Hi everyone. I've started a blog to workshop some ideas connected to my manuscript-in-progress, which I'm currently calling Normlessness and Nihilism. I'm at the very early stages of writing, and would very much welcome your comments and suggestions. My plan is to write 1-2 posts per week. The blog is HERE.

Don't get Mad; get CHill!

A much-anticipated announcement from Russ Shafer-Landau:

The annual metaethics workshop that's long been held at UW-Madison is now moving (along with yours truly) to UNC Chapel Hill. There will be no workshop in Madison this year. The dates of this year's workshop are Oct. 30-Nov. 1, 2015.

Deontic and instantive morality

Morality is not exclusively deontic.  There are, after all, many things that are morally good to do though not required, or morally bad though not forbidden. However, a deontic conception has gotten a grip on the contemporary conception of interpersonal morality, or morality insofar as it has to do with proper relations between persons in virtue of their personality. One presently popular conception of interpersonal morality runs along these lines: Interpersonal morality consists in obligations or duties that are incumbent on all persons; to have a duty is to be accountable to somebody. If I am accountable to somebody, then she has standing or authority to demand my compliance; and to exercise this authority is to be disposed to respond to noncompliance with Strawsonian reactive attitudes and practices expressive of them. 

In the last chapter of my book, How We Hope, I identified a common interpersonal attitude that eludes deontic characterization: disappointment in a person, or feeling let down by a person. I proposed that holding people to demands is only one mode of interpersonal relation, and that placing hope in people is another. Demanding involves a disposition to the central Strawsonian reactive attitudes of resentment, indignation, and guilt (and perhaps contempt and shame, which I will come in a bit); placing hope involves a disposition to disappointment (and perhaps some positive interpersonal feelings like gratitude and admiration, which I will also come to later).